belief-o-matic: hours of endless entertainment

Those "hours", btw, don't come all at once, but due to my continual return to this funny little survey. With all due respect to Aziz's blog, Belief-O-Matic is my favorite part of Beliefnet. The results vary, depending on when I take it and my overall mood, but the following are typical results for me (including only those results above 90%)...

1. Hinduism (100%)
2. Mainline to Liberal Christian Protestants (99%)
3. Orthodox Quaker (92%)
4. Eastern Orthodox (91%)
5. Roman Catholic (91%)

or

1. Hinduism (100%)
2. Eastern Orthodox (94%)
3. Roman Catholic (94%)
4. Mainline to Liberal Christian Protestants (94%)

For those of you who don't know, my home church is Melkite (which is Catholic), though I quite regularly attend the Orthodox parish immediately behind our house since the closest Melkite parish is about an hr away. Thus at some level, the results are quite satisfying. The tool clearly measures my deep identification with the Catholic/Orthodox tradition.

I do find several things amusing about the tool though. First, while the rankings vary almost every time I take the test (which keeps me coming back), Hinduism is regularly the first or second choice and I can never remember it coming in lower than 90% (unless I was playing with the survey, trying to get a specific result). This is true despite the fact that I have no real interest in or attraction to Hinduism (ok, I love Bollywood, but that never struck me as in any way Hindu-specific). I did my coursework on it when I had to, with a professor I liked a great deal and who really loved India and Hinduism...but for me...nada. So, the survey, while it did describe my own self-understanding with Catholicism/Orthodoxy, is also measuring something I am not entirely aware of and which runs counter to my own explicit self-description.

At one level I know why and how this happens. At the end of the day I am a Platonist who read too much Hegel. I am very comfy with language of the Absolute, etc., and find the answers which explicitly use the word "God" in the survey to be too mythological for my taste most of the time. Moreover, Hinduism, as it is understood by this survey, is compatible with Christian claims, as understood by this survey, concerning the Incarnation and Trinity. In reality I think that the two are theologically fairly distant from one another and that the survey is capturing a possible similarity in language that is fairly thin in reality. If, realizing this, I try to answer the questions, esp. concerning God, in a manner that stresses the One, Hinduism falls down the list, but so does Catholicism/Orthodoxy for whom the doctrine of the Triune God is central. In fact, because Hinduism shows a great deal of flexibility concerning talk about God, Catholicism and Orthodoxy fall even further down the list than Hinduism does, thereby defeating the purpose of changing my answer.

25. Islam (31%)

Ok, so if Hinduism gets overrated by the survey, Islam gets hammered, despite my deep love and active interest in Islam. Again the reasons should be obvious. Say "Incarnation" and watch Islam plummet down the list. Say "Trinity" and watch Islam literally beg the survey to no longer be included for possible consideration. Still...Islam gets ranked, almost every time I take the survey, down at the bottom of the list with the JWs and nontheism (two which definitely belong at the bottom of my list), and it makes me wonder why.

Clearly, at some level, Islam is simply a category that does not contain a lot of nuance in the survey. In fairness, neither is Hinduism. We are all aware how broad religious practice and belief can be in Hinduism and one category covers the whole spectrum for this survey. It is my impression, though, that in the case of Islam, the category is narrow, not broad, i.e., it does not include a lot of variety in religious practice and belief that are clearly also present in Islam.

In any case, we come to one of the fundamental decisions made by the designers of the survey regarding Xty...or at least my Christianity. The fact that I affirm Christ as God (the Incarnation) places me closer to those who affirm various manifestations of God (and this includes neopaganism and new age, etc.) than it does to Islam or Judaism. This strikes me as fairly poor understanding of Christianity and its history, to say the least, even if it does raise interesting questions, e.g., if a Christian decides that, despite their belief in God, Jesus is not God, do they enter into a world where there are many incarnations (e.g., Jesus is one of many beautiful souls who manifest God) or a world where the prophets, of whom Jesus might be one, point to something Other?)

In any case, I left curious about how other people score on the Belief-O-Matic and what unexpected kinships (or distances) they might find.

Lawrence the Hindu, signing off....

Falsafa and Kalam: Concerning Justice

The discussion ... goes to the source of the dispute between Western and Islamic legal systems: the distinction between reason-based ethics and revelation-based ethics.
-jinnzaman, in comments made at eteraz.org


[This was originally posted on 19 March 2007. A pair of conversations over at Talk Islam (see here and here) have inspired me to repost this, and to link to it from the Talk Islam site. Please note that all links to the original conversation at eteraz.org are now broken, and as such have been removed. -LoA]

In the midst of a very heated discussion last week at eteraz.org concerning the nature of the government one ought to desire, there was another set threads that took up a distinct, but not unrelated discussion concerning the role of reason within theology. Especially since JM made several substantive references to Al-Ghazali, and I made occasional and not-so-substantive references to Al-Farabi, Ibn'Arabi and Ibn'Rushd, the discussion harkened back to a debate that took place during the classical age of Islamic philosophy and the tensions that emerged within Islamic thought after the discovery of Greek philosophy. Falsafa is itself, obviously, a loan word from the Greek and so philosophy was constantly vulnerable to charges of 'innovation' in the Arabic speaking world.

I repost the conversation, as it occurred across several articles, for a pair of reasons. First, it touches upon issues that are dear to me. The call of God, under which we all stand, places us in a position such that we are, unavoidably, often against our own will, pilgrims towards a Truth which exceeds our present moment. Second, I think it is important that the discussion between Philosophy and Theology not be forgotten, because while we certainly do not comprehend God, reason will always reach out to transcend itself toward that which it does not yet know. Moreover how we understand our relationship to the God that becomes manifest in revelation will, unavoidably, shape our understanding of the political realm.

Finally, the term "positive", as it is used here by both JM and myself means "something one experiences as simply a given; having and needing no other justification than its sheer givenness". It is a datum or positum (in the sense that you might posit something, or de-posit money into the bank).


Francisco de Goya, "El Sueño dela Razon Produce Monstruos" (1799) [Etching with Aquatint]



In an ongoing discussion at eteraz.org, Irshad Manji had suggested that the following would need to be inserted into the St. Petersburg declaration in order for it to be signable:

“Practicing Muslims are an integral and valuable part of the global community, as well as essential to any movement for secular, faith-respecting states that work toward universal human rights. We acknowledge the peaceful observance of Islam to be a legitimate choice for many. We stand by those who embrace an Islam that defends critical thinking, empathy, justice, and non-violence. They are our allies, and we are theirs.”

To this jinnzaman (JM) responded with the following brief comment:

I have two questions: (1) Why do you think human rights are universal? (2) What is your definition of justice? Is it one that is based on Islamic sources of legislation such as the Qur'an, Sunnah, etc or do you subject the Islamic source to contemporary Eurocentric ethical systems?


JM followed up this comment shortly thereafter with:

The dis[tinction] is not a false dichotomy, but goes to the source of the dispute between Western and Islamic legal systems: the distinction between reason-based ethics and revelation-based ethics. By contemporary European ethical systems I'm referring to Kantian, Utilitarian, and social contract theories of ethics. By Islamic ethical systems, I'm referring to the theological framework established by the various Kalam schools, the Asharis and Maturidis. The aqeedah of Ahl us Sunnah is that their is nothing that has innate goodness/badness within it; these terms are defined by Allah (subhana wa ta'ala). As such, what is termed as "justice" is not what human beings define as "justice", but rather, what the Creator deems to be "just" since He possesses the attributes of infinite knowledge, foresight, and justice. Thus, when people talk about "reforming" Islam, they usually either inadvertently or intentionally interpolate contemporary Euro-centric ethical views into the classical Islamic traditions. One area of conflict is over this definition of "justice". For Muslims, the central concept of human relationships with one another as well as their Creator is the concept of submission to the Creator, not liberty. In other words, all ethical obligations and rights are granted or taken from the Creator. Thus, asking questions such as: what is the definition of justice, and whether human rights are truly "universal" and on what grounds other than tautology, syllogism, or social contract theory, are entirely pertinent questions.


This pair of comments, combined with JM's post entitled "Firestorm" which outlined a political vision of the Islamic world that was (for me at least) disturbingly close to the failed and destructive policies of the '79-Revolution led me to respond and defend the rights of falsafa. I, of necessity, speak as a non-Muslim; I am Christian. But the issues raised here have such bearing on how one understands the relation between revelation and reason, how one must do theology, and the relationship between God and the world, that they cross the divide between all of us who believe in the God of Abraham and unite us in a common conversation. This is not, then, a conversation about whether or not God has revealed Godself, but a matter of humanity’s disposition in the face of the God who reveals.

Reason itself must be a divine creation and therefore oriented toward God and so there can be no strong divide between philosophy and theology. Second, even if we were to accept some sort of rigorous distinction between reason and revelation, one can only know revelation by way of reason. One needs reason to understand what it says. this would mean at the very least that even if reason could not by its own power provide any knowledge of what was good it would at least have to provide a formal structure by which something could be known: reason would be the power to know and if something was to be known it would have to conform to the human capacity for knowledge. this raises two points: 1. this actually brings you very close to Kant; 2. even an analysis of the conditions of knowledge can actually tell you quite a bit about what revelation must be, what God must be and who humanity must be in order to conform to the formal structures of reason. Third, a position which strongly separates revelation from reason actually contributes to and helps maintain a strong understanding of the secular and thus the types of "justice" and "liberty" which are meant to be denied by a pure theology are going to be reinforced by theology's insistence that it remain pure. The other side of that is this: to separate knowledge of God from human knowledge really leaves God an unknowable and arbitrary power undermining any hope of union or reconciliation with God. There is nothing but submission to a tyrant for no other reason than fear of its power.


This prompted JM's reply:

Firstly, where did you get the impression that Muslims treat reason itself with disdain? What we're discussi[ng] are rational systems, not reason itself. Criticizing deontology or utilitarianism doesn't make one irrational, especially when a person is doing so on purely rational grounds. My point is that before applying these ethical systems to Islam, they need to be substantiated on independent grounds. This request isn't a denial of reason, but an assertion of rational justification.

Secondly, reason is a divine creation, but so are base desires, which are nonetheless prohibited in Islamic jurisrpudence as a source of morality. The question needs to be asked: why should reason be used as a source for ethics in the first place? What type of reasoning are you referring to: rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, dialectical materialism, science, etc. Islamic theology incorporates rationalism, empiricism, and possibly pragmaticism, as well as mystical tendencies. It is as equally valid a tradition as Western reasoning is, although it is definitely distinct. Just because Muslim theologians came to different conclusions from Western philosophers does not make them irrational. The dispute itself is over how we reason and which type of rational conclusions are utilized in moral judgments. Second, with regards to the argument that reasoning must be used for relevation, again, I would ask you what you mean by "reasoning" and why do you think its a basis for understanding revelation. The Qur'an is a self-extrapolating document. One doesn't need to be a philosopher to engage in basic statutory interpretation. The issue is whether the direct positive commands of an infinitely knowledgeable being can be properly comprehended by beings that are finite in their existence in knowledge. Muslims believe that God is suprrational, not irrational. In other words, they believe God is beyond reasoning and we might not always understand His reasoning. This is why His explicit and unambiguous statements are taken as positive commands. So while reason is utilized to understand the texts themselves, they cannot possibly understand the legislator's intent aside from a basic hermeneutical analysis.

I'm not sure about your third position and whether you've substantiated it so I'm going to ask you lay more foundation. Terms like "good", "evil", "justice" and "injustice" are defined by the Creator. Things are not good/evil in and of themsleves. Justice is not a quantifiable property; it is not a physical characteristic of a material object, it defines human behavior. If the moon crashes into the sun and gets obliterated, this might be a catastrophic event, but it is not 'evil' or 'unjust'. These terms are moral judgments and again, this goes to the question of how moral judgments are made. For Muslims, the source of our ethics is from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) and revealed texts. Western ethics are based on certain pressupositions that ultimately get reduced to metphaysical assumptions that are ultimately tautological. If they are tautological, then an opposite statement is equally valid. There are no ethical or philosophical grounds by which Westerners can criticize Islamic ethics, otherwise an equally valid right exists for Muslims to criticize Western ethics.

The Islamic conception of God is one of infinite knowledge, power, justice, but also of infinite concern with humanity. his legislation is there for the ultimate benefit of humanity in this life and the next, even if we don't comprehend it. The goal of paradise is not merely physical pleasure, but being in the company of the creator. So, I don't really buy this whole idea of God being tyrannical. It simply is not possible for a human being with finite knowledge and limited sensory perception to comprehend a being with infinite knowledge. separation is a necessity, not an option.

Lastly, the ultimate purpose of rights and liberty from either a deontological or utilitarian perspective is to promote autonomy. Autonomy is defined as the promotion of volition and the negation of forces of coercion. Western political philosophy focuses on developing measures to prevent external measures but fails to take into account that human beings have innate trends that infringe upon their own autonomy. For Muslims, coercion is external but also internal as well. Islamic law rejects the base self (nafs) as a source of legislation and ethics. Personally speaking, irrespective of my religious views, I agree with this conclusion.


Before getting to the larger response, I think it is important to note that one has to accept this criticism of "foundationalism" if, by that term, JM means that humanity possesses some sort of sure and secure standpoint, of itself, by which it is capable of judging the truth of things, the truth of revelation even, for itself. I have no desire to deny this criticism of foundationalism. Our whole being is experienced in its gratuity and the Truth itself comes in freedom (which should not be confused with choice between two options). But this is merely to say that our being is directed beyond itself, towards God, who is All-in-All.

I want very much to be clear: I did not say that Muslims treated Reason with disdain. I was specifically being critical of the position you articulated. The position you are espousing is not specifically Muslim, nor is it by any means the position of Islam as a whole. You certainly find versions of it among Christians and others. The real dilemma is that the contrast between a "reason-based ethic" and a "revelation-based ethic" is problematic from the start because the so-called revelation-based ethic is always going to be dependent on reason, for, at the very least, both its acceptance and its interpretation: which is precisely what the contrast is meant to disallow. Nor do i have any desire to deny the appeal and rationality of the various traditions within Islam. No tradition can have the broad appeal and the ability to organize cultures, nations, peoples, the ability to generate amazing works of mathematics, philosophy, architecture, the arts etc, and not provide a compellingly rational account of the world. Though my knowledge of Islam is quite limited, i have nothing but respect for al-Farabi and al-Arabi, with whom i am somewhat familiar and for that matter do not understand them to be so far removed from many of their non-Muslim counterparts. But i don't think either you or I believe they are all "equally valid …tradition[s]", otherwise it would be a matter of indifference how we aligned ourselves with respect to the various traditions. The fact that i cannot help but orient myself toward God in one away, rather than another, means that for all my respect for (and in some cases lack of respect for) other traditions, i find them less adequate, compelling, promising, etc. They lack rationality for me, somehow, to an extent that i cannot embrace them as my own. There are reasons, for instance, why you are not Presbyterian!

The crux of the matter here is that Reason is always in play, always at work. to make an appeal to that which is beyond Reason as providing an unassailable truth is to leave the bounds of meaningful conversation. I can only understand the claims of texts like the Qur'an or the Bible insofar as they make an appeal to me. This is not to say that the texts ought to be philosophical, but the claims that those texts make on us in the end demand a judgment: will we embrace them as our own, or no? The fact that we are finite beings points to reality that the discussion over the Truth is not yet closed, has not yet reached its completion and is not yet fully known. Once again, if it were, there would be no need for this discussion. also once again, this is not to deny that one always finds one tradition more adequate in pursuing the Truth, but the Truth has not yet been fully realized. One is still in the troublesome position of having to make judgments.

The appeal to the infinity of the divine is the way in which many of us, including myself, talk about the brokenness of our own self-understandings, the incompleteness of any account that one might try to give of the human person in the present moment. It is essential to the way in which we talk about the fact that we desire to be more and other than we are, that we desire to transcend ourselves; we desire ecstasy; we desire to be Whole.

On the other hand the appeal to the infinity of God cannot be a way of short-circuiting Reason and the way in which it guides us in all that we do. Reason always extends itself to that which it encounters as merely positive, in order to incorporate, understand and judge it. You attempt to reduce Reason to a purely hermeneutic faculty with respect to revelation. But Reason will not allow itself to be so limited. Already, under such conditions, Reason will run ahead of the experience of revelation and set the conditions by which any such thing can be given. Revelation will have to present itself in the same way as any other object; any positive revelation, 'revealed religion' as the nineteenth century thinkers were fond of calling it, will have to enter into and become a part of the world of objects. At the moment it does this it becomes part of Reason's drive to grasp the world in its completeness. Likewise Reason will run ahead of any discourse and set the conditions. Experience, even the experience of revelation, must manifest itself to us, to specific kinds of knowers at a specific time and place.

Moreover, by even granting that there is such as space that belongs to revelation alone, over against Reason, which would apparently be left to go off and construct regions of human inquiry like mathematics and biology, one creates the very divide by which the secular arises. The secular becomes the space of merely human endeavor. In allowing the secular to arise in such a way, one actually reinforces the social and political conditions that allow liberalism and capitalism. Instead we must insist that it is precisely through the cultural discussions we have, which include arguments over the meaning of terms like "justice", "good", "liberty", "freedom" that we are entering into a discussion over the nature of humanity and its life toward God. We are concerned with human wholeness. This allows no space for the secular - a position with which i suspect you are sympathetic. It is precisely by denying the split between reason and revelation, by tying the two inextricably together, by insisting that the human person cannot be so schizophrenically divided, that one is in a position to criticize the dehumanizing effects of liberal life.

And this has bearing on the point concerning the arbitrariness of God. If God is conceived as that which is so other that Reason cannot go there, that the commands of God must be accepted merely as something positive, then humanity finds itself in the grip of a tyrant. We obey, not because we experience the commands as the truth of who we are, or even as Truth, but because we are at the mercy of that which threatens to overwhelm us. You push the understanding of God in this direction when you insist that "good", "justice", "evil", "injustice" etc. are entirely dependent on the meaning which they are given by the creator: that they do not have inherent meaning: that, somehow, to say Good and Justice is not also to say God and the Infinite, with all the problems involved therein.

If, when you said that these terms of no meaning in themselves you simply meant that of ourselves we are nothing, I certainly would not argue. But this still does not break the connection between Reason and the divine since insofar as we are we are from God. And, moreover, insofar as we are, our rationality drives us back towards that which is beyond all existence: the All in All.

Given some understanding of creation, I am not sure that Islam, any more than Christianity, can allow that any of our desires are truly base. Certainly we often direct our desires towards inadequate ends, but we are, as whole persons, desirous of the Good which is God. I am not sure what exactly one means when one says that these desires are not a source of ethics. As I understand it (and, i stress that my understanding of Islam is quite limited) the 'nafs' indicate precisely the lack of light, the misdirection and deformation of the will and thus that desire is not correctly ordered and illuminated. In this case it is not that one rejects an analysis of human desire in ethics or politics, but that one criticizes the inadequacy of certain desires. Surely the satisfaction of basic material and physical necessities is fundamental to any account of a just society as well as individual concern for other persons. And one moves on from there to try to satisfy higher order desires.

The very limitations to being human, to which you are sensitive in stressing the need for revelation, are the very reason it is important to remain with Reason. It is there that the Truth is manifest. It is the reason we struggle. It is why there is theology and philosophy. Human beings desire the Whole.


At this point the conversation came full circle and we turned to a discussion of how one might go about understanding what it is we mean when we say "Justice". Another defender of Kalam, Saif, stepped in at this point. His contribution is important in that it shows there is more at stake here that has been shown so far. The attempts of falsafa to defend itself against the critiques of Kalam, do not only bear of the status of Reason, but also address the question of whether or not time and History must be treated as real aspects of humanity and thus of God's manifestation to humanity.

I think that there needs to be a separation of God's law and the application of God's law to a particular case. Shariah is man's best attempt at application of Allah's law in my opinion.

Whatever you may say, shariah does not only apply to the individual. History and the Quran testify to this. I don't advocate allowing adultery at the state level. I don't advocate allowing homosexuality at the state level. I don't advocate allowing anti-Islamic things. Now it is time to use a cliche statement: "No person is an island." Every human being has an effect on other human beings. Granted, these days with no Islamic leader there is no one to apply the Shariah, so we are left with applying it to ourselves. I don't think that this means classifying the Shariah as only applying to the individual.

I'm just wondering...since when are the literal interpretations of Quran and Sunnah unjust? I am completely against calling them unjust. The prophet used these punishments, but in a different context, and he was definitely not unjust. How does justice change over time? Are we some new human race 1400 years later? No. If you want to base leniency on the mercy that the Prophet practiced and encouraged, then I'm ok with that.

….

Innovation is external. The essence of the human being, his soul, is the same. If I was transplanted to 1400 years in the past as a baby and was raised 1400 years in the past as a baby, I'd fit in 1400 years in the past with no problem. I think the same is true if someone from the past was transplanted to today.

The human being did not change at all. All that changed were the external conditions in which the human was raised. Does that mean that our external conditions define who we are, and we should do nothing except adapt to them? I don't think so...we should play an active role in shaping the external contidions to what we see as fit, what we as human beings define as right, which for Muslims are Allah's commands. We have a will...we can do it.

I don't think that chaos and needless suffering is the goal. What is unislamic about technology, about science, etc.? What is unislamic about certain types of clothes, aside from a lack of modesty? Nothing. There is no purpose in wearing 7th century Arab clothing today. There are many things in this world that are not right though, and Islam, the essence of Islam, should not take a backseat role only if everyone else does it. We have a responsibility to right.

Yes, warfare has changed. Powerful countries drop nuclear bombs and develop them while advocating nucear nonproliferation. Rich countries declare war, drop bombs, cause chaos, and then decide to leave. Thousands if not millions of soldiers and civilians die needlessly, for nothing more than powerhungry rulers who they foolishly swear allegience; soldiers do not fight in the name of their ideals. Wars are not fought in the name of justice, but greed. Even worse, a war in the name of greed of money or power is hypocritically fought in the name of justice. All is not well with the world today. I think that the world is getting worse day by day, not better.


In defense of falsafa I replied:

saif said: "If I was transplanted to 1400 years in the past as a baby and was raised 1400 years in the past as a baby, I'd fit in 1400 years in the past with no problem. I think the same is true if someone from the past was transplanted to today. The human being did not change at all. All that changed were the external conditions in which the human was raised."

This is pretty much to say that human beings have changed. Culture is not an external. There is no rigorous divide between the individual and its community. 'Human being' is not some timeless reality independent of its historical location as your own statement itself acknowledges. One acts in the time and place in which one is, out of the possibilities given in that situation. This is not the same thing as quiet conformity, it is simply a recognition that the questions and problems facing us today are not the same as those that faced humanity, e.g., 1400 years ago.


Saif responded briefly with:

No, what I said is the essence of a human being is the same, that a "human being" is a timeless reality. The only differences come from the conditions in which we are raised. I didn't state what I meant clearly when I said that culture was an external... I forgot to mention that culture is internalized...that is why I said to transplant a baby to the past. If people 1400 years ago are so different from us today, then what about a man born in a village vs. a man born in the city. What about a man born in the US vs. a man born in a very poor country? Are they completely different people? Is there a different definition of justice for both of them, or is there one definition of justice? I'm not advocating going back to 7th century arabia and using all of the laws from there. I'm saying that justice does not change between times. There is an eternal definition of justice. There is a such thing as right and wrong...they are not relative. All that can be done today is try to apply the ideal of justice to whatever situation we find ourselves in today.


Insisting upon the real historical nature of human being and rationality, I replied:

Obviously, justice then and justice now are two different things. Just look at the way visual representations of justice have transformed if nothing else. While courthouses regularly have statuary of blind-justice (justice with her eyes covered by a blindfold), such a representation would have been non-sensical or representative of a failure of justice in the middle ages.

Ideals are hardly eternal; they are instead deeply connected with the practices of the communities of which they are a part. one can think of the way in which ideals of marriage or love have changed over...the last century...not to mention 1400 years. And I suspect, even as it is within Christianity, that it is very difficult to talk about the human essence or human nature within Islam, because of the doctrine of creation. Essence or nature usually refers some quality of a thing taken on its own. The essence is what divides it from everything else. But in and of ourselves human beings are nothing, we only are insofar as we are from God...and even in that [our] being does not find its end in itself, but must exceed itself, back towards God who is beyond all being.

And what else, but that can you possibly mean when you say that we try to apply the ideal of justice to this or that situation than that we try to live our lives towards the divine? To desire Justice is to desire God. Our traditions are the continued attempts to overcome our brokenness and find Justice, the Good, etc.

All of this is not to say there is no continuity between us and our past. We can only have gotten here from there. But history happens as humanity struggles for wholeness.


This brought JM back into the conversation on behalf of Kalam with a very thoughtful and articulate statement of what was at stake in his understanding of justice:

Let's start defining terms like "justice", "autonomy", "good", "evil".

As I stated before, the interpretation of the term "justice" from a Western perspective and an Islamic perspective is different. Both Sunnis and Shias believe that the Shari'ah is inherently just because they emanate from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) who is all-knowing and infinitely just.

The benefits/burdens of ahkam are not limited to the material world, but include the benefits/burdens accrued in the hereafter, which are greater than this world. Unlike previous Prophets, Rasulullah (sallahu alayhi wa sallam) was a universal prophet who was to deliver the message of Allah to all of mankind until the day of judgment. Thus, his commands and those contained in the Qur'an are presumed to be binding unless shown otherwise.

When I say "Islamic" conception of justice, as opposed to Western, I'm referring to the formalized opinions of experts in Islamic theology. For Ahl us Sunnah waal Jam'ah, this would refer to the Atharis, as well as the two schools of Kalam compromised of the Asharis and the Maturidis. For Shiat ul-Ali, this would refer to the aqeedah developed by their scholars that is similar to the Mu'tazila. Clearly, the claim that 'there's no distinction between Western and Islamic conceptions of justice' is merely a claim that requires substantion. Although their may be some overlap in these terms, they have different roots. The underlying roots, by which rational and moral judgments are made, in Islam is revelation. Rational arguments may be persuasive, but not mandatory. Conversely, Western philosophers don't take revealed texts as the exclusive source of rational and judgments. Revealed texts is persuasive, not mandatory proof. Claiming that there's no difference between Western philosophers and Islamic theologians is a tautological statement in the absence of proof.

According to Ahl us Sunnah waal Jam'ah, the definition of justice can be divided between substantive and procedural justice. Substantively speaking, the ultimate source of our understanding of justice comes from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) who has the attributes of being all-knowing, infinitely just, etc. Islamic law in this sense, adopts a legal positivist approach: laws from the creator are not in and of themselves independently just, but are just because the Creator Himself commanded it and since He is infinitely just, His pronouncements, commands, and prohibitions, are all just as well. I think the problem you're having is that, whether you recognize it or not, you've adopted a sort of platonic conception of justice. Justice is not a physical property of material objects. It cannot be measured, quantified, added or subtracted in a laboratory. Things are good because God says they are good and things are bad because God says they are bad. For example, for Iblis, prostration to Adam (alayhi sallam) was an obligation. However, in the time of the Prophet Muhammad (sallahu alayhi wa sallam) to anyone other than Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) was forbidden. Prostration in and of itself is not good or bad. It was good/obligatory in the time of Iblis and it was bad/prohibited in the time of the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam). Now, the punishment for committing theft or adultery are deemed obligatory in the Shari'ah according to the fuqaha. These punishments are substantively just because they are the direct commands of Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) or the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam). Had Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) commanded Ibrahim (alayhi sallam) to sacrifice Ishmael (alyahi sallam), then this would have been just and if He commanded its opposite, it would have been obligatory as well. Now, this might seem contradictory, but the law of non-contradiction doesn't necessarily apply to the Creator. Amongst the Asharis who wrote about this, Imam Juwawyni held the opinion that God is not subject to the dictates of the human intellect. In other words, Muslim theologians recognized that the finite human intellect, like the angels who questioned the creation of mankind in the first place, can not comprehend the will of the Creator who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and infinitely just. God is not irrational, but He is suprarational; beyond reason and comprehension. The perfect example of this is in the case of the narrative of Khidr and Musa (alaihi mus sallam). In this story, Musa tagged along with Khidr (alaihi mus sallam) in order to acquire spiritual knowledge. Khidr (alayhi sallam) (1) sunk a ship, (2) collapsed a wall, and (3) killed a child. Musa (alayhi sallam) objected to each of these because, from his perspective, they were apparently unjust. Khidr (alayhi sallam), however, had knowledge of the future as well and explained that their were reasons why he engaged in those particular actions. Musa (alayhi sallam) didn't have knowledge of these future events and thus, his conception of justice was limited to particular temporal and spatial restrictions. The point of the narrative is that we as humans might not be able to fully comprehend why things may be prohibited or obligatory. Allah (subhana wa ta'ala), being infinitely knowledgeable, does not possess the limitations which human beings possess.

To elaborate further, the fuqaha have stated that their are various conceptions of the purposes of the Shari'ah. According to Imam Shatibi, the goals of the underlying objectives of the Shari'ah were the promotion of (1) faith, (2) property, (3) family, (4) intellect, and and (5) life. Perhaps the term "objectives" is misleading, a better term might be "rationalizations" because one does not base one's rulings on Maqasid al Shari'ah, but one follows the methodologies laid forth in one's usul al fiqh and maqasid is used more in areas where their is ijtehad. Of course, one can absolve a legal ruling based upon overriding concerns, but this is usually in the case of exigent circumstances, not a general practice.

For example, the consumption of alcohol diminishes control of one's intellect. People lose control of their volition and are more prone to making bad decisions. Some times they destroy property, which impinges upon another maqasid of the Shari'ah. Other times, they may engage in fornication, and this impinges on the maqasid of promoting the preservation of the family. Other times, they may get into fights, which may result in the taking of life, another concern of the Shari'ah. The underlying reason, however, why the consumption of alcohol is prohibited is because Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) commanded it. It can be understood by rationalizing it, but the rationalization cannot supersede the literal conclusive proofs if they constitute an amr that constitutes an obligation in the absense of mitigating proof. As you can see, these things, when applied, promote harmony in society. However, the benefits from the implentation of the Shari'ah are incidental, not fundamental, to the conception of justice.

However, substantive justice isn't the only aspect of justice that emanates from Islamic law, there is also procedural justice as well. In other words, the punishment of a crime may in and of itself be unjust even though the declaration of a particular action to be criminal is just. The perfect example of this is the punishment for adultery, which requires four witnesses that actually see the act of penetration. Unfortunately, some so-called Islamic republics or states today implement the Hadd substantively, but fail to properly understand the procedural requirements. Mufti Taqi Usmani wrote an extensive article explaining this distinction in an article where he dealt with a lot of misunderstandings that people had with the Hudood Ordinances in Pakistan. In reality, one must look at the totality of the circumstances. A Qadhi scrutinizes the reliability of each witness, whether they were trustworthy, whether they had the proper faculties to observe the crime, whether their testimony was internally consistent, etc. Furthermore, the Qadhi looks at whether the testimony of each witness was consistent with the testimony of the other witensses, whether their was any collusion, whether it was consistent with the testimony of the accused, whether it was consistent with the forensic and physical evidence, etc. Thus, the punishment of the crime in principle may is just, but the way that the crime is punished may not be.

In addition to substantive and procedural justice, there is personal justice which is treatment of members of society in a just manner. This goes in the topic of adab, akhlaq, and mu'amalat. One must treat one's neighbors, family, elders, woman, children, indigent, sick, orphans, in a just manner by fulfilling their rights. These rights are defined by Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) and the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam).

These are the basic forms of the Islamic conceptions of justice.


For reasons I hope are clear by now, what is concerning, to me, throughout all this is the positivist understanding of the law and justice (and hence revelation as whole) which in fact denigrates the very nature of being human and as such undermines creation.

I think the first thing to note, again questioning the strong division you wish to create between Islam and the West, is that there are plenty of western thinkers who take revelation to be normative (Karl Barth most prominently from the 20th century), and of course there are traditions of legal positivism within the western tradition as well: Carl Schmitt most prominently in the 20th century, and Schmitt is making a come back in a new form in figures like Chantal Mouffe; not coincidentally Schmitt's own legal positivism is theologically based, influenced by the understanding of God and revelation introduced at the 1st Vatican Council (a council which picked its own fight with so-called "secularism"); Schmitt is also the father of contemporary western political theology as well being chief jurist for the Weimar Republic and early in the Third Reich.

Also, continuing to question the strong division between Islam and so-called western thought, you point out that my thought is influenced by Platonism and this is of course true, though in an historicized form: participation (methexis) in the divine is mediated historically. But to say I have Platonic influences again does not constitute a serious breach, in itself, with Islam. It is my appreciation of the Neoplatonic tradition that makes al-Farabi appealing, ibn'Arabi, ibn'Sina; and then of course there is ibn'Rushd who is rolling over in his grave at every word that you write.

I have not, in all this, been trying to argue that there were no differences between various traditions of philosophy and theology in the west and in Islam, merely pointing out that the gap was hardly as deep as you would like it to be. In certain areas there is even convergence. Nor have I ever meant to imply that convergence in things like legal positivism means that Islam was copying European thinkers; instead I am merely pointing out that the understanding of the law that you are articulating is not uniquely Islamic (and for that matter is not the only understanding of the law within Islam). And yes of course it is my idealism or Neoplatonism, as you note elsewhere, that makes me cringe every time you take a positivist line.

you say: "Things are good because God says they are good and things are bad because God says they are bad."

This is precisely why I argued elsewhere that you break the link between humanity and God and make God into a tyrant. According to this position we obey God for no other reason than God threatens to overwhelm us in its power. But, thankfully, your positivism is not consistent and you drift back towards a meaningful account of justice yourself.

you say: "laws from the creator are not in and of themselves independently just, but are just because the Creator Himself commanded it and since He is infinitely just, His pronouncements, commands, and prohibitions, are all just as well."

Here you once again begin by asserting the merely positive nature of the law. It is given and must be accepted for no other reason than its sheer givenness. But in the second half you affirm that God is itself Justice and so that which proceeds from God shares in that justice. Now I suppose you could reply that this is meaningless and incomprehensible jabber and you simply use the term justice because it is a revealed name. But in order for it to be a truly meaningful claim there has to be some connection between our desire for Justice and our desire for God. In this case we recognize the law as just because it contributes to the fulfillment of the desire for the Infinite (which is the desire for God-Justice). In this case the "rationalization" of the law is not a secondary operation following upon its positivity, and indeed the law cannot be just without its capacity for rationalization. The law is just only to the extent it is intelligible. And on the flip side of this, if the law responds to human desire for justice, or satisfies the rational demands for justice then it is in accordance with the human pursuit of the divine.


And finally, because I have been controlling the shape of this conversation, I end with a brief statement from JM that came in response, and summarized his view…

With regards to the assertion that Islamic law is essentially a legal positivist tradition, I would pretty much agree with that. However, if it advocates legal positivism, it isn't because Western civilization advocated this view, it is an independent conclusion. Again, I have no problem with studying Western philosophy with the recognition that Islamic philosophy is a distinct way of thinking that has its own concerns and deals with certain problems by its own distinct methodologies. While there are similarities, they are still two different paradigms.

-LoA

When Liberalism Loses the Courage of Its Convictions

This week the chief prelate of the Church of England, the widely respected Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, suggested that England find a way to accommodate the traditional forms of Shariah law, especially with respect to family disputes, within the legal structures of the United Kingdom. Williams is a scholar and academic with outstanding works on topics ranging widely from the Arian controversy of the 4th c. AD to the work of the Russian Orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov. This is hardly likely to be a spontaneous or thoughtless comment; instead it is likely to be the studied opinion of the most vocal and important spokesperson of the English government on matters of religion and faith.

In recent days I have been preparing to teach a course on world religions. It is not a task I relish since the whole discipline of world religions is a minefield of Orientalism. As a theologian, I am struck by the lack of systematic thought that has gone into the idea of dialogue with those who exist extra ecclesiam. It has sparked in me a hint of admiration for Political Liberalism insofar as it has one of the most well conceived, systematic and coherent "theologies" of religion in the West. Insisting on the private and moral nature of religion, Political Liberalism has managed to sublimate the great traditions that preceded it under its banner. Its post-Christian Protestantism insistence on the separation of faith and works allows it to leave the beliefs of the traditions "intact" while nonetheless bringing the practice of all into accordance with its vision of who humans are and the nature of a stable human community. The Secular is not so much an a-religious space, but a transreligious one with new rituals and liturgical forms that organize and interpret - and ultimately relativize - the place of other traditions in the life of its citizens.

The allowance of parallel legal institutions with the UK strikes at one of the central tenets of Politically Liberal "theology" of religions: the separation of faith and works. As a Roman Catholic the separation was never particularly appealing and it has always fascinated me the extent to which Catholics have failed to fight against it in their desire to enter into the mainstream of Liberal cultural and political life (JFK for instance had to embrace it in order to legitimize his candidacy). Nonetheless, when Liberalism begins to question the foundations of its own existence one has to wonder whether or not Liberalism has lost its faith. Is the Liberal experiment failed?

And what next from the Archbishop of Canterbury? It has been suggested that the creation of parallel religious courts will help Catholicism in such matters as adoption. Many adoption agencies in the US and the UK have run into problems as they are required, under existing law, to allow same-sex couples to adopt children (in the state of Massachusetts for instance, Catholic charities no longer arranges adoptions). But what else will be covered. Will divorces be denied to Catholic couples? What criminal charges will a husband be allowed to bring against his wife if he finds out she is using birth control? If he finds out she had an abortion - i.e., in the eyes of the Church, committed murder?

Where is Liberalism going?

islamocommunism?

Odd Nerdrum, "One Blind Singer and Two Dancers" (2001)

What's next? I will grant that the comparison between the ideology of the revolutionary movements present in the Middle East to post-WW2 Communism is an improvement. It is at least a better comparison than the poor comparison to fascism. At least Communism was transnational in its own self-description. And certainly, Mao and Stalin destroyed their countries in the mid-twentieth century, murdering freely, imprisoning arbitrarily and generally using fear and power to extend their rule. Their programs of national reform destroyed the heritage of their people. And Mao and Stalin had just about as much in common with Marx as the Taliban (for instance) does with most practitioners of Islam: each tyrant twisting the words of a prophet to justify the deaths of any and all who disagree with them.

But the fact that one day the Islamic terrorists can be fascists and the next day they are communists, one day the Nazis, the next day its a Red Islam (not that Shariati minds), makes clear the extent to which the rhetoric is just that: rhetoric. Bush and company are no closer to understanding who and what they are fighting against today, than they were the day before or will be tomorrow. As with all good Islamophobia, the rhetoric is not meant to identify the enemy so much as rally public opinion into a cohesive and deadly force. Bush and company are grasping at straws, desparately comparing their enemy to enemies of old in an effort to contain them, comprehend them and make the American people understand why Islam is such a threat to America (not the "good Muslims" of course. *wink, wink*). Its a major victory if government policy makers can tell you the difference between Sunni and Shia, let alone the differences between an Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood.

And finally, one must ask, will we allow our country, our governments to kill in the name of its own idols? Has the fanaticism of Bush been less deadly? The Goddess of Democracy has been the justification for the destruction of Iraq, and many within our government would to build a new Temple to her in Iran as well. Her hands are red with blood and her priests are calling out for more victims.


-LoA

carnivals of the week

allow me to point your attention to a couple of carnivals that are linking to my little corner of the desert this week.

the 10th carnival of islam in the west is up over at aaminah's blog, and the 175th christian carnival is up over at rey's bible archive.

enjoy,
LoA.

Theses on Orientalism and Islamophobia

1: Public opinion is held by no one, but is the opinion in which one becomes Other to oneself.


Steven Assael, Untitled [Superman] (2006)

2: It would seem that public opinion represents the consciousness of a group of people as they unite and impose their will upon some relevant authority, whether that authority be some government official of whatever rank, the local radio station or the bakery across the street. But this is not the case. Public opinion is not the expression of the power of a group, but the manifestation of the powerlessness of the self in the mass in which that self has become anonymous or abstract. It is the structure of a collective and therefore external identity.

3: That there is a connection between Orientalism and Islamophobia is not a surprising declaration. They are intertwined ways in which the Occident orients itself towards the Other as threat. But two things must be realized here.

3.1: First, every Other is, as such, a threat. This is not unique to the Oriental. They represent a comparable but separate desire with its own projects which is capable of appropriating resources and values which I may need against my will. Orientalism, then, represents the way in which the specific threat represented by a particular object, now called the Oriental, is thematized so that it might be put into practice.

3.1.example: This is different in content and scope, but comparable in its form to my relation to my neighbor, who is likewise an Other and a threat to me. Let us say that along the property line between my property and theirs are two rows, very close to one another, of blueberry bushes. The property line runs directly between these two rows of blueberry bushes. When my neighbor goes to cut the grass they are not able to ride the lawn mower directly between the two rows of bushes and so they always use the weedeater to tend to the blueberry bushes. One day, knowing that I have hurt my ankle, the neighbor trims around my bushes for me in an action of recognition and reciprocity between us. This allows me to complete my lawn care on the riding mower. But the next week, the neighbor does it again. And the next week again. Now there is confrontation and conflict regardless of the (let us say it already!) supposed good will of the neighbor, because if I allow the behavior to continue, at a certain point, in the eyes of the state of North Carolina, the property will pass over to my neighbor because they have cared for it (and we all have John Locke’s theory of property to thank for that). The bushes that were mine and which I used to make desserts and such to my great delight, will no longer be mine. The neighbor becomes in my eyes crafty and deceitful, a dissembler, who flatters me on the one hand while trying to steal from me on the other. The neighbor must be watched at all times because they are lazy and shiftless, not content to gain profit in a legitimate way, they would rather take what belongs to and has been nurtured by another, namely myself.

3.1.conclusion: Their separation from me and from my interests is made necessary by the nature of the object itself – my property – which constitutes them, by its very shape, as a threat, as an Other whose projects may interrupt my own, ultimately in a critical and perhaps even fatal way if things spiral too far out of hand. I need know NOTHING about my neighbor in order to know this. This is the truth of who they are in relation to the object in question, no matter what subjective characteristics they might possess. In other words it is objectively the truth: it is the truth carried in and constituted by the object itself. So we can summarize the first move of the object is that it constitutes the Other as Other and in this case as someone lazy, a liar, tricky and dissembling, greedy and lustful, etc., and I must adopt this attitude towards the Other if I am going to act in my own interests.

3.2: So the object makes the Other into the Other, but the truth of the matter is that the object also makes me into an Other.

3.2.1: Islamophobia, as the reflex of Orientalism, is not, first of all about the Oriental. It is about me. It describes the actions that I must take in order to maintain myself with my desires in the face of this Other, this Oriental, who is a threat. Once again, this is not a description of some subjective attitude on my part. It is not necessarily reflective of who I am in my personality, subjectivity, or selfhood, etc. It is who I am objectively, i.e., in relation to this object which demands maintenance and defense from me. My attitude and actions are given to me by the object as part and parcel of its character. This means that once again the attitude of Islamophobia is given to me as someone anonymous. Who I am does not matter other than the fact that I, like any other of a certain type, stand before this object in a particular way (as an American, and most probably as a White American). What matters is this generic identification which is indifferent to who I am individually. In other words, I receive my actions and attitudes as externalities. The I-who-acts could be anyone, any member of the genus to which I happen to find myself a part. I receive them as something Other than who I am; I am Other-than-I-am.

3.2.2: But we can take it one brief step further. To a certain extent MY Islamophobia is not even the attitude I hold indirectly, but the attitude I hold for Others, or, to put it otherwise, it is not the attitude I hold, but the attitude that I wish other members of my genus to hold. As an individual I need not hate the Oriental. I am capable of making individual judgments about good and bad Orientals. This is the source of that timeless but irrelevant defense in the face of my own racism: “I have Oriental friends; I cannot be an Islamophobe”. The problem is that the Oriental is a threat not only to me directly, or even more correctly, is not a threat at all to me directly, the Oriental is a threat to me-as-member-of-a-genus (e.g., American or Westerner or civilized humanity). The threat is not only to me but to me through all the other members of my genus. I am threatened through them and I am powerless to protect myself from the threat that occurs to me through them. Thus I need them to hold an attitude which will protect me from the Oriental-threat. I need them to defend me with all vigilance (the same holds true, by the way, for other members of my genus about me – they are threatened through me and I must maintain vigilance for them). Thus when I adopt the attitude of Islamophobia, as the attitude objectively required by the object (America, civilization, Christianity, etc.) I am not adopting it for myself as such but as the attitude of the others of my own genus to whom I offer myself as example.

3.2.example: Let us return to the much lower stakes of the owner of the blueberry bushes. My aggression against my neighbor is not based on my subjective attitude towards them, but out of my bushes’ demand that they be maintained by me if I am to use enjoy tarts in the summer. Moreover my own good will towards my neighbor is irrelevant because I must live the aggressive maintenance which the bushes require of me as an example to my neighbors so that they too will maintain their property and thus protect the common laws of property against any violation which would jeopardize mine in turn and in so doing expose me to harm and, if things were to spiral out of control, complete loss of property and death.

3.2.conclusion: Thus my phobic attitudes are doubly Other to me, or, better, are the attitudes-I-hold-as-Other-to-myself. They are the objectively demanded attitudes that all members of my genus must hold and which I hold as an example to the other members of my genus, due to my own impotence, as a reminder of the attitudes they must hold in order avoid exposing me.

-LoA

more from charsadda and nwfp

It appears there was a grenade attack on Monday against yet another music store in NWFP, this time in Sherpao. This is a continuation of similarly themed attacks that have been ongoing in the area. The story also reports that vendors in Charsadda said that they had been warned to stop selling such items for fear of Taliban attacks. It is not clear from the article if the warning came from local magistrates interested in their safety or as threat from someone.

I bring up the story for two reasons. First, I cannot find this news story on anywhere near as many news outlets. Even the Pakistani English-language newspaper, the Daily Times, only has a brief article on it. Clearly actual attacks against private business owners who are, presumably, Muslim is not as news worthy in the eyes of the BBC, et alia, as anonymous letters sent to "threaten the Christians of Pakistan" (play melodramatic music here). This despite the fact that one of the persons responsible for the attack was reportedly apprehended. Who were they? Is it Taliban related? Is it the wife's brother's cousins getting back at the husband for having an affair? Enquiring minds want to know. I want to know.

Second, just to continue the fun of trying to trace down the truth concerning the threatening letters understaken in yesterday's post, this timeline of events in the North West Frontier Province, which is actually quite handy, does not mention letters at all, but says instead that the threats against Christians were chalked onto the side of a local Church in Charsadda. I am going to rule the chalk-theory out on the basis of the picture which the AP provided, even though, given all the contradictions in the reporting, I am still going out on a limb since I can not read Urdu and if they put up the same picture and told me it was the grocery list his wife had given him that morning i would have to believe them. *sigh*

good luck with your news reading,
LoA.

trying to read the news from pakistan

Puck, "The Evil Spirits of Modern Daily News" (1888)

[All links provided at the end of the post.]

Last week, in a post on the challenges facing religious minorities in Pakistan, Saliha linked a BBC article concerning threats that were made against Christians in the town of Charsadda by means of an anonymous letter. Saif responded in the comments to Saliha’s post that the article struck him as a bit of propaganda, and I must admit that my first response was very similar to Saif’s. I actually thought Saliha’s post was very good and that she had made much much(!!) better use of the story than any of the news outlets that were reporting the story.

Several things bothered me about the way the media approached the story. I will begin with the BBC article in particular but then move on to look at broader coverage of the story in the U.S., U.K., Pakistan and elsewhere.


1. I think the number one thing that bothered me about the BBC article was the way in which the anonymous nature of the letter did not give the BBC one moment of pause. No one signed the letter and no one has claimed responsibility for the letter and thus one really has no way of judging the letter itself. For all the BBC knows, this was a couple of guys out on an all night bender that thought scaring some Christians would be funny. Now, this is not to say that as a Catholic if I were in Charsadda I would not be concerned. I would indeed be very troubled and no doubt frightened by such threats especially given the bomb attacks that had already occurred in the area.

2. But the inability to evaluate the significance of the letter was not important to the BBC and it is passed over in silence. This is a news story in their eyes, and does not need any such evaluation, because it confirms to them and to their presumed readers, the preconceptions of Pakistanis and Islam that they already have. As Saif points out, no legitimate religious authority would support such a letter, yet, despite this fact, you have no indication from the BBC that they even tried to get a response from one of the local Imam’s or even a cleric in Islamabad. The function of the story is simply to remind us how violent and uncivilized Pakistanis and Muslims are.

3. Factual inaccuracies: I do not know what they mean when they say John Michael, a Christian member of the Pakistani parliament, is the head of the Catholic Church in Pakistan, but as far as I can tell he is not a Roman Catholic bishop. Also, as far as I can tell, the head of the Catholic Church in Pakistan is still the Archbishop of Lahore, Lawrence Saldahna.

4. This brings us into the realm of more much more troubling challenges that face us as readers of the media. How can we tell what is going on? Who do we rely upon? One of the things I usually try to do with stories like this one, a half a world away with sketchy information, is try and see what other media outlets are saying. When I did that in this case, it was like I had fallen into a spider web and the more I tried to free myself (i.e. find the actual truth of the story) the more deeply I became entangled in the web.

- Let us start with the letter itself. The BBC report indicates only one letter. They show a picture (purchased from the AP) of a man, a cross behind him, holding the letter up for the camera to see. Yet other news agencies indicate that a number of letters were sent to various churches containing the threat, others that it was a mix of churches and homes (FOX, picking up the AP, reports 2 churches and several homes). An Indian outlet reports that the letters were received not only in Charsadda, but also in Mardan. It is in fact one of the Pakistani outlets that seems most helpful, if their information is presumed to be reliable. They report that the letters were photocopies of a hand-written note, written in rather crude Urdu. But this would seem to be contradicted by a Christian news outlet (whose sources are unspecified) that reports that the various letters received by different parties were not identical [Note that this same news agency has a bit from the 21 May edition calling Jerry Falwell a “cultural hero”].

- Then one has to deal with the threat itself. The BBC article, in its opening paragraph, written in bold print just so you don’t miss it, reports that the Christians are threatened with bomb attacks if they do not convert within the allotted 10 days. Christian Today puts a whole phrase about dire consequences and bombs in quotes, as if they were quoting the letter (or some other unnamed source). AsiaNews headline says that the Christians have been told to convert or die. These claims - the BBC, Christian Today and AsiaNews - seem to be untrue. Most news agencies are reporting that the threats are unspecific, noting only that there will be consequences if they do not convert. The above mentioned Christian news agency says that there are definitely letters that do not specify consequences but it is “reported” that some letters contain bomb threats. That is true insofar as the BBC is reporting that there are bomb threats, but no one seems to have any actual letter – unless the BBC knows something no one else knows, in which case they need to be clearer in their article. The AP provides the only translation of the letter that I could find. In its earliest article (from 12 May – oddly its 16 May article is much more inflammatory and for all intents and purposes says the Taliban wrote the letters), in the above mentioned picture taken by Muhammed Zubair, the following translation is provided:
{"Inform all Christians to covert to Islam or to leave this place. Otherwise you will be in trouble."
Thursday, May 10, 2007 in Charsadda, near Peshawar, Pakistan.}

- Another British outlet, the TimesOnline, reports that as a result of the letters "Christians have fled their homes". Now this is arguably important because it provides a way of judging whether or not Christians believe that the letters represent an escalated or new level of danger for them. Now I suppose, technically, in order for the TimesOnline claim to be true, one would only need at least two Christians to leave their home as a result of the threat. But clearly the opening sentence of the article is meant to imply that Christians have decided to make an exodus from the area. This seems false. Most outlets are reporting that a few Christians have left, but the vast majority are staying put. The BBC, who at least has the decency to provide a reporters name for the story, has Barbara Plett telling us that a few families have left but most are simply “living in fear”. Melodramatic, and not particularly helpful since it turns out that Ms Plett is reporting on the story from Islamabad and thus clearly has no way of confirming for us that what is being said is true. One Pakistani outlet, not surprisingly perhaps, is reporting that no one(!) has left as a result of the letters. This is stated by the local police chief and confirmed by a Christian source. While I find it improbable that a couple of people did not at least say to themselves, “I have not seen Auntie Mary down in Lahore in a long time; now would be a good time to visit”, it also seems unlikely that Christians have caused a traffic jam on the road south out of Charsadda: especially since the number of Christians we are talking about seems to be between approximately 500 and 600 people depending on which news organization you ask (the Middle Eastern Times reports, e.g., 50 families). Moreover at least this outlet has been responsible enough to provide two independent sources for the fact it is reporting and provided names for both of their sources. Clearly this is a revolutionary idea for modern journalism. They also note that the Associated Press had reported migration from the area and give the name of the AP source. I swear, it is almost like they know what responsible journalism is. Maybe the BBC should take notes.

- And then there is the matter of who is actually delivering the threat. The AP wire, picked up by FOX (FOX picks up the feed without the picture or the translation of the letter, interestingly), among others, opens its 12 May report with the claim that the letter is the work of “extremists” even though a few paragraphs later they admit that the letter was unsigned. It’s 16 May report goes even further, virtually declaring the Taliban party the author. The ironically named Christian news outlet, WorthyNews, declares in its headline that “Militants” are “forcing” Christians to convert and shutting down their churches. Besides ignoring the fact that the letters were anonymous, it makes it sound like armed militants are on the streets compelling Christians to say the shahada while they nail-shut the doors of local churches. Perhaps the most egregious offence on this score is from the Indian media outlet, The Times of India, which unambiguously identifies the letter-senders as the Taliban.

- The official response is another matter that is extremely unclear. If you are to believe the AsiaNews, which is a news service aimed at Catholic readers, the authorities are treating the letters as a “joke” and the Christians of Charsadda are callously being ignored. One can see how they might have inferred this, since a Pakistani outlet reports that the chief of police called the letters “immature” and said that the Taliban were much more sophisticated in their methods. But to say that he does not think that the letters are the work of the Taliban and to say that he is going to do nothing is two different things. And he goes on to say that special measures are being taken to ensure the security of Christians and churches. Now it might also be the case, at the very same time, that Christians do not feel secure despite whatever measures are available to the police. And this seems to be implied by the BBC story and others. But even the BBC notes that police have been stationed near Christian interests.

- Now, while I think it is fair to cut them a break, especially when talking about headlines where they are forced to conserve space and be economic with their words while at the same time trying to inspire you to want to read the story, I think it is also important to notice the way in which the words Christian and Pakistan(i) are used in these articles. Over and over again Christians are mentioned in the headlines as if all Christians of Pakistan were being threatened, and not 500 to 600 in a portion of NWFP. Moreover Pakistan is often used in the headlines in a way that could suggest that it is the Pakistani government or some official authority that is attempting to compel this mass conversion. Clearly Pakistan, if that word refers to the country and its powers, are not complelling anyone to convert, and the letters did not come from Pakistan.

- And, finally, to take up Saif’s complaint, which I believe is a relatively legitimate one. Only the news services, like the Middle Eastern News, which picked up the AFP feed and the quote from Shabaz Bhatti, have any statements denouncing the letter and claiming that they violate the spirit of Islam. Even that paragraph is not terribly clear in the AFP feed and it is not clear who is speaking, who the “Alliance” is, and whether or not the speaker is Muslim. A better version of this article (perhaps the original full version, I can not tell) is found at ChristianToday, where one learns that the Alliance is the “All Pakistan Minority Alliance”. Moreover, I presume that the All Pakistan Minority Alliance is a private organization, but who they are and what they do is unstated. Unfortunately, the Christian Today article fails to mention Shabaz Bhatti by name, so I have to put those two pieces together from two different articles. Another thing that the Christian Today article does well is link this event with broader events affecting religious minorities in Pakistan, mentioning the recent failed legislation that was brought before Parliament for the equal treatment of blasphemy no matter which religion was involved. Saliha has also provided us a very useful post on that topic. The 12 May AP report is also one of the few (the only one?) that provides a quote from Pakistani authorities insisting that religious minorities in Pakistan have the right to practice their religion and that their rights will be protected by the Pakistani government. This statement disappears from nearly ALL subsequent reports from other news agencies. Moreover no one seems to have gone to the “trouble” of attempting to interview religious leaders in Peshawar or Islamabad or anywhere else to get their reaction. Meanwhile we have statements from Christian leaders in Islambad and Lahore, as well as foreign Christian figures denouncing the threat to Christians. This is the point at which the articles, especially from the Western media come very very close to being propaganda. They refuse to even acknowledge the need to seek the opinion of Muslim voices. The presumably Muslim voice of the letter(s) is the only voice they can hear. Whether or not it is self-consciously propaganda, it is Yellow Journalism by any standard.




________________________________

The following provides, I believe, a complete list of the all the links that were referenced in this post, beginning with Saliha Shah's two wonderful posts on religious minorities and the freedom of religion found at eteraz.org:

Saliha Shah, "A Step Back for Religious Freedom"

Saliha Shah, "Why Protect Religious Minorities?"

AP - 12 May (includes translation of letter), "Pakistan Christians Receive Threatening Letters Urging Conversion"

see FOXNews version of same article here

BBC (as already linked by Saliha Shah), "Pakistan Christians Demand Help"

Middle Eastern Times (picking up the AFP feed), "Christians in Pakistan Ordered to Convert"

The TimesOnline, "Christians in Pakistan Told to Convert"

AsiaNews, "Christians Threatened: Convert to Islam or Die"

The Times of India, "Pak Bishop Slams Taliban Threats"

Worthy News, "Pakistan Militants Force Christians to Convert to Islam and Shut Churches"

The Daily Times, "Threatening Letter to Christians in Charsadda: Police Guarding Homes and Churches"

Assist News Service (ANS) [A Christian News Outlet], "Letters Threaten Pakistani Christians to Convert to Islam"

Christian Today, "Christians Have 10 Days to Convert to Islam in Pakistan"

AP - 16 May, "Pakistani Christians Warned to Convert"

-LoA

W(h)ither Fascism?

If one were to continue to propose entries for Milan Kundera’s “A Short Dictionary of Misunderstood Words”, certainly, today, one would need to add FASCISM. It seems to me there must be at least two components in place to have a genuinely fascist government, party, organization or movement. First, and probably most importantly, there must be a desire to rally the citizenry and organize the political realm around the idea of the nation-family: some common racial, or ethnic heritage, some common, natural, language, possibly, within which the cultural inheritance is passed down across the generations. There must be, then, a very rigorous form of nationalism, where the idea of the nation is taken quite literally: nation as a reference to our natus, or birth.

Secondly, fascism relates to the economic reorganization of the nation along the lines of a state capitalism in order to revitalize the productivity of the worker, but also to provide security for that same worker. Ernst Jünger, one of the economic theorists of fascism, argued in ¬The Worker (1932), for instance, that the revitalization of German industry was linked to the revitalization of German men, warrior-men, and thus the strength of Germany itself.

In both cases, what one sees is the nostalgia for roots in the midst of an uncertain, and economically unstable world, where one found one’s identity through conformity to one’s nature, one’s nation, one’s natus. Oswald Spengler’s “conservative revolution” was premised on the politics of natus, against the internationalism of liberalism and Marxism, and for Jünger, freedom was only found in giving oneself over in obedience to serving and protecting one’s natus. In both cases there was a longing for a strong leader who would rally and lead the people in this new nationalism.

From this it ought to be immediately clear that Islam is stridently anti-fascist. The Ummah, the unity of those who submit to God, is a unity of all peoples without regards to race, nation, or ethnicity. Politically speaking mainstream Islam has taken a variety of political forms, but none of them have been fascist: one could point to imperial or monarchical (with roots in the tribal organization) as perhaps the most common.

But of course this is not the way fascism is being used; instead it has been used to focus attention on elements at the Right extreme of Islam: Al-Qaeda, etc. Islamo-fascism: the enemies of liberalism. Now it is true, as already mentioned, that fascism was anti-liberal. Rightists from Spengler to Heidegger saw liberalism as decadent, promoting mediocrity and weakness. But this in and of itself is hardly fascist, it is a position shared by many Rightists. There is an abiding emphasis on the Ummah within Al-Qaeda, bringing together Arabs and Pakistanis and Afghanis and Southeast Asians in a way that is not always seen due to racial tensions that do persist among the various groups. Moreover the criticism of Anglo and Continental governments, the criticism of their decadence, is entirely religious in its basis, not nationalistic, and the same could be said for the criticism that one sees from the militant parties within Islam against certain Middle Eastern governments themselves, especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Finally one must say that there is nearly no economic component to the critique or the ideological thrust of the militants.

The Islamists seem to have two basic goals: the re-establishment of the caliphate and the universal extension of shariah law. With that in mind, one is left to wonder why we do not call them what they are, virulently anti-liberal, imperialistic theocrats, instead of the terribly inaccurate “fascists”.

Is there, then, a rise of fascism today? If so, it must certainly not be where the Anglo and Continental governments have wanted to identify it. There has also been a tendency amongst the Left, following the initial impulses of persons like Michel Foucault, to identify the universal penetration of Anglo and Continental life by the forces of Late Capital, what Adorno would have called the Culture Industry, as fascist because of the surreptitious conformity it evokes in its citizenry, its ability to extend control. But again one must point out the antithetical nature of Late Capitalism, and really one should say Capitalism generally, and fascism, due to its universal aims and its reliance, in cohort with political liberalism, on universal ideas of nature and human nature that unite everyone of all races and creeds under the natural law of rights (and thus competition). Indeed one would have to say that those who oppose the globalizing impulse behind Late Capitalism are indeed the more significant regressive forces, and insofar as those concerned with distributive justice, whether liberal or Leftist, have been willing to accept such arguments within their ranks, they undermine the cause of freedom and equity which they pursue.

Likewise there is a tendency on the Right to identify, rather haphazardly, all liberalism as socialism and all socialism as fascism. One must say, within the American context at any rate, there seems to be no real socialism and certainly no Marxism that is politically effective. No one in the mainstream of American political life is engaged in a critique that points the historicity of the liberal-capitalist complex, nor possesses any sense that Capitalism might collapse under its own success. There is nothing in American politics that suggests that the dominance of Late-Capital and the accumulation of private property ought to be or can be disturbed. There is simply a preservation and management of what is apparently seen as the natural order. Moreover, even if there were a genuine Marxism in this country, one would be forced to point out that no two groups hated each other more than the Marxists and the fascists: Marxism insisted on a universal conception of freedom in which no one could be free unless all were free, while fascist nationalism sought only a local definition of freedom and believed that Marxism undermined the natural order of things. This is why Marxism was able to make common cause with liberalism against fascism in the form of the Popular Front: both Marxism and liberalism, in different ways supported a universal conception of freedom and equity.

One should grant, in passing, one significant point here, to the Right. The economic reforms of the post-depression era, not only in America, but throughout the liberal world, were largely inspired by fascism’s economic success. But one also has to say, knocking on wood, that fascism has no real soil in which to take root in America, as it might in Europe. America for Americans is almost laughable, compared to France for the French, or Germany for Germans. Who would those Americans be? There is no common natus, no common language or culture, around which Americans would be able to rally. This is the cause of Heidegger’s judgment that American’s could never be authentic: they are, by definition, a people without roots. And indeed fascism had far less success and support in the United States than it ever did in Europe.


One might ask then, one last time, whither fascism? Is there any sort of fascist revival going on in the contemporary world? I would suggest that there is though neither in the United States nor in the Islamic world, but once again on the Continent of Europe where it had its appeal to begin with. For many years countries like France and the Netherlands have prided themselves on being bastions of liberalism with a very generous immigration policy built around the Enlightenment ideal of cosmopolitanism. Yet in the wake of the instability in the Middle East and threats of terrorism primarily from Muslim groups and several incidents of violence, one has seen nationalism reasserting itself on the Continent.

The re-emergence of the Right, in the personage of the late Pim Fortuyn, for instance, was a clear sign of tidal change on the once liberal Continent. This was followed in France by the restriction of immigration, vigorous debate on the standards of citizenship, and a highly controversial law which banned religious attire in schools and government offices (while it affected many different groups in minor ways, it was aimed primarily at the elimination of girls wearing hijab to school). Finally, there are new and recent incidents in Germany, which has been suffering under a well publicized resurgence of Neo-Nazism in the public arena. Using a law dating which dated back to the Nazi regime itself, German law enforcement made the decision to arrest a Baptist woman for the crime of home-schooling her children. The mother, who remains under arrest, is now separated from her family; the father took the children and fled to Austria. Nor is the mother's case unique as the German government seems intent to crack down on home-schoolers, many of which are Christian. Meanwhile there was the infamous case of the Moroccan woman who was told that since she was from Morocco she should expect subhuman treatment at the hands of her husband and that German government would not get involved in any extraordinary way.

I would suggest that the real place we need to fear the resurgence of fascism is among our N.A.T.O. neighbors. The debates over immigration, citizenship and identity, the legal decisions that have been made recently in Germany and France are disturbing signs. The motivation in all cases has been a renunciation of liberal values and the demand that the people of the nation conform to some idea of the natural cultural identity of the nation-family and that all forces that run counter to that ideal must be suppressed in this time of crisis. Crisis was always the excuse of Rightists from the time of Oswald Spengler forward.

The mis-identification of fascism does not help us to understand the extreme problems and challenges that are faced in the Islamic world, while at the same time it blinds us to the regressive threats to liberalism much closer to home.

the opportunity for political islam

Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.”
-Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics

Apologia
I have spent much of my academic career in that borderless space known as Political Theology, stubbornly refusing to acknowledge the differences between philosophy, theology and political theory. This will be a work of Political Theology. Yet I am nonetheless venturing out of my depth and so I must provide some sort of apologia, both in the technical sense and in the more colloquial sense, since it is not a work of Christian political theology, but Islamic.

First a defense: The idea of writing such an article arose out of a prior discussion concerning the establishment of an Islamic state. In this discussion I was merely a reader and critic, pointing out what I saw to be flaws in the proposal and questioning, in particular, the legitimacy of any State that did not have freedom of speech and the press. Without those, claims to legitimacy would have to be accepted entirely on the authority of those whose interests were most at stake. I was then asked my thoughts on the possibilities of a liberal Islamic state. What follows will constitute my reply.

Second an apology: This article is in danger of being the voice of yet another non-Muslim telling Muslims what Islam ought to be. This is not my intent. And, in advance of offending someone of faith due to gross errors of fact, my complete and utter lack of knowledge of knowledge regarding the tradition and the long history of its interpretation (which I am not even going to discuss), and the history of the political life of the Islamic faith, I wish to make clear that I am not prescribing what Islam should be. I wait with anticipation to see what Islam will become. All I wish to do here is outline what I (and who am I after all?) see as a possibility open to Islam in the present historical moment. I find it an interesting possibility because, as I will mention further in a moment, it is not a possibility that is open to Catholicism.


Political Liberalism
Political Liberalism emerged in an attempt to overcome certain social tensions, particularly religious tensions, that were present in various states, and presented itself as a way of subsuming and managing those tensions without completely evacuating or nihilating the differences out of which the tensions arose. This meant that social and political peace could be purchased without having to eliminate the contending parties. Instead, differences that had been politically decisive were reinscribed as civic divisions that did not extend into the public political sphere. In this way the divisions remained, but were demoted in importance, or rendered unimportant from the standpoint of the law.

Two key ideas were indispensable to this reinterpretation of previously political categories into civil categories. The first was abstract justice, or what Rawl’s terms ‘justice as fairness’ or the priority of Right over the Good. Abstract Justice is doctrine that all citizens are equal before the law. This is an abstract claim because it does not address equality in the day-to-day lives of its citizens. Instead it says that in the eyes of the government all the citizens are of the same importance and will be treated the same. Justice is blind. The other side of this is that everything that divides one person from another is allowed to remain at the level of civic discourse and practice: Jew or Greek, Rich or Poor, Male or Female; the divisions that structure private life are of no interest to the political entity.

The second important idea was that of negative freedom. For most of theological, philosophical and legal history, it had been assumed that the freedom to choose was really the least important understanding of freedom and the lowest kind of freedom. True Freedom was about the ability to do the Good. Even in figures such as Kant, whose politics are entirely liberal, one sees this idea persist in his account of autonomy. Autonomy is present when the will acts in accord with its own principles, and is not guided by outside forces which would enslave it. This meant that questions of the Good were inseparable from the establishment of freedom. It led to some of the grossest violations of the human person, embodied in the Inquisitorial dictum that “Error has no rights”.
Negative freedom is the freedom from constraint. The State would allow, inasmuch as it was possible, for persons to pursue whatever Good they saw fit. The State would be indifferent to this. The State would simply provide the framework within which persons were safe to pursue their freedom and did not live in fear of having their freedom arbitrarily violated or constrained by other citizens or the State itself.

Since the wars of religion provide such an important mythological underpinning, even to this day, for the justification of Political Liberalism, I will simply use religion as an example of the way in which these two doctrines served to eliminate political unrest. First the State became blind to the professed religion of its citizens because of Abstract Justice. In a court of law, if and where one attended religious services, or what one believed was irrelevant to one’s standing in the eyes of the law. This likewise meant that the law itself could not be written in such a way as to promote or protect one religious body over another. Secondly, people were then allowed, on the basis of negative freedom, to pursue whatever religious affiliation they desired as a civic or private matter. The question of the Good was left to individuals and to voluntary civic organizations to work out as they saw fit, as long it did not disrupt public order.

In all that has been said in this section thus far we have simply presupposed the State, but let us say one final word about the Political. Liberalism, taken on its own, is at least super- if not anti-political. The claims of Liberalism concerning the Rights of Humanity arising out of the abstract equity that has been described and its ability to exercise its freedom independent of the interference of others conceptions of what ought to be done, is universal. Nonetheless, the turn to the Political recognizes the need for some body capable of providing the public order within which freedom might be pursued and a power capable of rectifying the situation should one’s freedom be violated. This political body can only be legitimate if it provides the necessary conditions of the possibility for individual persons to live out their freedoms and thus does not violate their inherent equity. As long as the Political provides this, to violate the laws of the State would be to violate one’s own person because one would be undermining one’s own freedom and equity.


A Liberal Islamic State?
Let us make a quick and clear distinction between elections and liberalism. The choosing of governments by elections is a secondary phenomena and is not of itself Liberal. Government’s based on elections, whether they be democratic or republican, etc., are not necessarily liberal. Nor does State need to have elections in order to be meaningfully Liberal, though elections are a handy way of allowing the people to ritually express their solidarity with the government which represents them. There is no inherent contradiction between democracy and the Islamic state. Recent elections in the Middle East should be ample enough proof of this.

Nonetheless I am going to argue that there is a contradiction between Liberalism and an Islamic state. Interpreted in a manner that is most benign, Liberalism misinterprets the nature of religion. It treats religion as if were merely a matter of the human spirit which is internal and private. Freedom of religion becomes simply a subdivision of freedom of conscience. Since the state deals in the material of human actions and religion deals with the internal human spirit, than can, by definition, be no conflict between the Political and Religious. Likewise, the religious institution is interpreted by Liberalism as a purely civic and voluntary society. Its actions do not and cannot, by definition, extend beyond the civic sphere. Its attempts to address social issues must act within the framework already provided by the state. Political life is, in no way, religious.

This in turns shows a rather fundamental anthropological misinterpretation on the part of Liberalism. Liberalism treats religion as if it were not a matter that concerns the human person in the whole of its being. Religion is merely one activity among others: one is a Muslim, a Girl Scout and a member of the Daughters of the American Revolution. In fact, important Liberal theorists call anyone who allows their belief in God to underlie the totality of their actions a fanatic and insane (e.g., Rorty’s treatment of Ignatius of Loyola; or the Rawlsian discussions of how to interpret the Amish and why the government does not suppress them).

This error shows up in a more fundamental way even at the point at which Liberalism is closest to granting religious belief its full determination. Religion is a question of how human beings will pursue the Good. But by making it a private matter, Liberalism likewise reduces religion to an individual matter. Even if we do come together in some sort of voluntary society, e.g., the mosque, to ask the question together, the answers that might be given are denied to have any ultimate importance or address humanity at the level of its universal destiny. The determination of human beings according to the doctrine of negative freedom essentially denies that humanity has, as such, a purpose or goal beyond what the individual arbitrarily chooses to take up as a task. Understood this way, any claims that Islam tried to advance within a Liberal setting about humanity in its universality, about the orientation of humanity in the fullness of its being towards God, or that all are Muslim by birth, must inevitably be viewed as mere opinion and gross fanaticism, even if it is allowed as a matter of free speech.

Interpreted more perniciously, this is to say that Liberalism only allows religions insofar as they further the goal of Liberalism itself. Liberalism tolerates religions because for Liberalism the religions are Liberal institutions aimed the formation of good private citizens: thus the reduction of religion to morality that is characteristic of Liberal discourse. They direct the citizen toward particular types of social activities and deal with problems in the civil sphere which can not be easily addressed by the Political. Religions and other voluntary institutions are the ways in which Liberalism organizes and forms its citizens through everyday activities.

Pushed even further, Liberalism cannot allow the interpretation of Islam or any other religion to bear upon the totality of the human person, to raise questions of Ultimate or transcendent concern because Liberalism is itself an alternative religion. Liberalism itself is that which sets the terms for the totality of the human being. While it claims to allow human beings the free pursuit of private goods, the fact is that religious pursuits in the private sphere must conform to the preconditions set by public order: they must conform to the formal definition of being human that is already given at the level of the Political and which the Political enforces since any breach by the private sphere is condemned as an encroachment upon the rights of others. If this is true than it is not the case, as with the benign interpretation, that Liberalism is unable to address the totality of human existence. Instead, Liberalism does address the totality of human existence and considers the questions already answered. Liberalism is itself a form of religious dogmatism.

This interpretation is reinforced once one realizes that the public/private split that is enshrined by Liberalism is a mirror of the Protestant division between works and faith. Public works are not important to the salvation of the human spirit. Works are meant merely to conform to the law. What works one does is a matter of indifference before God, God only cares what is in the heart. Understood this way, Liberalism is a form of Neo-Protestantism or post-Christian Protestantism.


The Hegemony of Liberalism
Yet, one might still say that if there is to be an alternative to Liberalism and its constant companion, Capitalism, the only place that one can look for it, in the present moment, is from within Islam. I expressed this idea once before, though, as I said at that time, I find it highly doubtful that it will be able to organize itself into such an alternative. But doubt is not the same as impossibility, and I do think it is imaginable. So I will briefly outline certain seeds that might allow one to think an alternative.

Normally I argue that there is no outside or beyond with regards to the Liberalism-Capitalism complex. This does not ignore that there remain segments of the globe that have not been fully integrated into that complex, but says that this lack of full integration is indicative not of the incompleteness of the hegemony of Late Capital, but of the way in which those segments which are not yet integrated lag behind from a production standpoint. But this only means that they offer ripe territory for the expansion of Capitalism as the Liberalism-Capitalism complex are driven by its constant need to create new markets.

That supposed alternatives have not offered real resistance is becoming increasingly clear. One can see this especially with respect to the (former-)Soviet Union and with China. Neither the USSR nor China represented Marx’s dream of what a revolution should look like. In neither case did Marxism arise as the revolutionary overthrow of an industrialized society, but instead it arose in these largely rural societies as an expression of frustration by the peasant class against corrupt and decadent rule. Soviet Marxism especially had to engage in a kind of apologetic to explain how it was indeed possible to skip over Capitalism and arrive at the Worker State, while the Chinese Cultural Revolution unapologetically sent its urbanites out into the country-side for re-education. The truth was that the new order was not post-Capitalist at all, but was instead a way of beginning to overturn outdated feudal economies and begin to incorporate industrial power. They were playing economic and political catch-up. This process continues in Russia and China, each in its own way: perhaps more smoothly in China where the government has gradually brought its economic apparatus into contact with the world markets and thus also gradually introduced Capitalist and Liberal reforms.

One might make similar observations about Chavez, for instance. Once again one is looking at a region which does not have the economic apparatus in place, nor the political and cultural infrastructure, to avoid being swept up in the rush of Capitalism and so, in the name of socialism and populism, Chavez is using temporarily available financial resources to try to protect his country from untimely incorporation and act as a buffer against Capitalism and Liberalism. One must likewise recognize that the Venezuelan economy, even more drastically than the Soviet and Chinese economies that came before it, is not sophisticated enough to maintain this resistance for any length of time.

I see two reasons to hold out some hope that Islam will stand and offer a real, progressive, alternative to Liberalism-Capitalism. The first lies in the power of Islam itself. Islam is a rich and complex tradition that is the heart and soul of millions of people world-wide. This is not a Marxism that was thrust upon large populations who suddenly had to re-write their entire histories in order to understand the new ideas. State incarnations of Marxism have always been, to a certain degree, the attempt to create a cultural identity from scratch. Islam on the other hand carries with it a long history of discourse about the nature of being human, an understanding of justice and mercy, freedom and law, etc. which are capable of extension and explication in very diverse ways, and thus of adapting themselves to new and unforeseen circumstances.

Second, Islam is the dominant cultural force in parts of the world which are either under-Capitalized or resistant to Late Capital. At one level, one can express suspicion that much like South America and the pseudo-Marxisms of Russia and China, these are regions which are trying to adapt their modes of production in such a way that they can at once protect themselves against advanced Capitalist economies and catch up to them. I will return to this idea in the conclusion with some sympathy. But one must note that they do stand in an interesting position nonetheless. The center of gravity in Islam has always been Arabia and it is difficult to foresee this changing soon. The Middle Eastern economy (and allow me to include Iran in this picture) has largely been a mono-economy based on oil. Egypt is an excellent example of the struggle faced by Arabian states without significant oil reserves. Yet such a mono-economy is endangered. Technology is eventually going to push beyond fossil fuels and that future is probably none-to-distant. Second, oil is itself a dwindling commodity. Even if technology does not overtake these economies, time will very soon. The time is coming very soon when the Arabian economy is going to have to reorganize itself in a massive way or face complete devastation (this quite frankly is one of the major instances of short-sightedness in the United States’s plan to reduce its reliance on foreign oil; and in the massive waste of money that one finds especially in Saudi Arabia). This will be a moment of social and economic redefinition. Assuming that this is done with some foresight, that the Saudis and Kuwaitis, the Emirates, etc. still have significant cash reserves at the moment in which this begins, assuming that they can break free of a client-patron model of relationship between the state and its citizens, then they will have the opportunity to reorganize themselves in a truly progressive way. Unlike China or the Russians, the imminent and foreseeable demise of the Arabian mono-economy provides the motivation to undertake such a large scale project.


The Possibility of a Modern Islamic State
What we are envisioning then is not a Liberal Islamic state, but nonetheless a thoroughgoingly modern one. By modern we still make reference back to the tradition of Continental Philosophy. Negative Freedom was not the only doctrine of freedom to arise out of the modern period. Negative freedom was simply one doctrine in an era fascinated by the idea of human freedom. Many recognized the limits of negative freedom and continued to advocate an idea of freedom that saw an intrinsic relation between freedom and the human Good.

Much of what the Muslim world resists in the spread of Liberalism-Capitalism is the inability of Liberalism to judge the good, the inability of its people and culture to evaluate the values of their projects in any other language than that of Capital. In short, they do not experience the encroachment of the Liberal tradition as being liberating because they see no connection between it and their centuries long reflection on the relation of humanity to God. Thus far the response to the spread of Capitalization and Liberalism has been reactive. It has brought about a rigidifying of old forms, a kind of cultural ossification. Religious authorities have attempted to resist the invasion by holding tight not only to power but to forms of life that pre-date the encounter with Capitalism and Liberalism.

I implore Islamic leaders not to make that mistake. This was likewise the path chosen by Catholicism in resistance to the spread of modernity, Liberalism, Capitalism and the growth of freedom. As a result they lost their legitimacy as the voice of freedom. Moreover they created a situation in which they drove their members, who looked to them for guidance, into the waiting arms of Liberalism-Capitalism because they refused to come to terms with the changes and only reacted with condemnations and anathemas against the new. By the time Rome was willing to enter into conversation with modernity, some 300 years after the fact, modernity had lost interest in the conversation and Catholicism is now left trying to situate itself a socio-political world in which it is a marginal voice and in which Christianity has largely been absorbed into the mainstream of Liberal society with all the implications mentioned above.

The Modern Islamic State then would be a place in which the people of the State would understand the purpose of the Political to be communal quest for that which transcends the Political. One could not avoid, of course, supplying the basic needs and comforts as well as security for the people, but having done that the people will not understand the State to have fulfilled its purpose, but merely to have laid the foundations for its role. Following those basics, the discussion can begin among the people concerning the nature of the Good and how that Good will be sought in the contemporary context.

The Ummah, the nation, is not then a closed entity. This is true on a number of levels. First the Ummah is capable of embracing the totality of humanity and it seeks and promotes a Good that is not limited in its scope. Further the universality of the Ummah points to the manner in which the State is not defined by a particular culture, set of customs or race. Islam is capable of rich embodiment and harmonic constructions of society. As a project of pursuing the Good it does not view Muslims as abstractly equal, but instead sees the equity of humanity to exist in the concrete particularity of their being. Thus it does not have to pretend everyone is the same in order to deal justly or fairly. This means it is capable of sustaining a wide variety of practices and traditions which it is nonetheless able to interpret as a common and universal project.

Since the Ummah is a communal project that interprets humanity in its totality as directed toward God, the Islamic state must not fall into the dogmatic political-fundamentalism that is characteristic of Liberalism-Capitalism. Liberalism-Capitalism assumes a universal and ahistorical human nature. Thus it believes that all humanity can be satisfied by the expansion and repetition of timeless government which is inherently desired by all. This dogmatism drives Liberalism’s colonialist attitudes and leads of its very nature to the consumption of that which it comes into contact with until all that is left is the abstract, cultureless and inchoate humanity on which Liberalism thrives. The Ummah, precisely because it is a not-yet completed project must remain open to hearing the voice of God anew. The Ummah will have to wrestle with its tradition and treat it as something living. It cannot look solely to the past, but understand the past to be the foundation of an as yet unforeseen Future. The Ummah is in motion.

Here, two mistakes must be avoided at all costs. One cannot treat the tradition as if it contained a deposit to which one merely needs to return. A deposit is dead. The God of the Qur’an is a God who speaks. God’s revelation is not the possession of anyone; it does not belong to humanity. To claim to have revelation in one’s hands is to claim to hold and contain God: it reduces God to a thing. Instead the Islamic state would be one which recognized that its existence is an attempt to hear God anew. It is not the possessor of the Word of God, but it continually awaits the Word of God and together listens to the Word which God speaks through the Qur’an and through the tradition. Anything less than this denies the very essence of the Islamic state because it makes God into the possession of the State instead of the State the possession of God. It means that, since the State holds the revelation of God, humanity lives for the State instead of living together a life toward God. It means the State blasphemously makes itself into a theocracy, thereby identifying State power with God, instead of a self-giving in which humanity surrenders itself over to God.

Moreover one cannot under any circumstances stifle free speech. This has been a temptation on the part of States throughout history, especially those that believed their purpose was to direct humanity toward the Good. Partly this was because the State often mistook itself for a direct embodiment of divine power. But more fundamentally it understood dissent to be damaging and a threat to the faith of the people. One must counter on two fronts. First, the only way that the State is going to fulfill its mission as the place in which, together, the people pursue the Good, make worship their common project, is if the people are able to engage in a discussion concerning the nature of the Good.

Second the quashing of dissent is not what is a danger to the faith. Instead, it is the stifling of dissent that is the greatest danger to faith because it suggests that the Truth is somehow unable to withstand critique. That which can be critiqued is not the Truth and therefore deserves criticism. The State which bans dissent mistakes itself for God, and becomes, thereby, worthy of even greater criticism. To allow dissent is to trust that the Truth wins out. God, who is Truth, is impassible: i.e., God is that which cannot be critiqued, divided, or threatened by any power. If something falls to criticism, then it was only a relativity in any case. This is part of what it means to insist that the Ummah is a project. To say this in another way, one must recognize that while the liberal freedoms are, in the end, the most trivial kinds of freedoms, they are nonetheless an essential part of freedom.

This leads us finally to the question of religious freedom. One must say that insofar as one is willing to participate in the Ummah and its project, the pilgrimage of the State toward God, one will be Muslim. Those other voices, whether they be Christian, Hindu, Liberal or atheistic, which will no doubt be heard in the public square, will, if they are untrue, find themselves in a marginal and uninfluential position. This is to say they will for all practical purposes exclude themselves from the common political life of the people. To set aside one’s dissent and enter into the political life of the community is also to declare common cause, a common faith. This may perhaps, in certain settings, mean the incorporation of certain goods that one finds among those who wish to make common cause. This brings us back to the rich, complex and universal nature of the faith. There is nothing good which is foreign to the Islamic state and which it can not appropriate.


Conclusion
I have attempted to outline a vision of the State that exists in a living relationship with the God who speaks, as it is understood within Islam. This thought experiment is an offering in which I envisioned a future for Islam that does not contain a repetition of the mistakes that Catholicism made over the course of the previous three centuries: ally itself with the powers of social conservatism and religious ossification.

But I end with a challenge; and this gets to the issue of why i do not ultimately believe there is an outside-Liberalism-Capitalism. The question is what will an economic alternative to Capitalism look like. Without this Liberalism will inevitably continue its hegemony. Such an alternative will also have to find its roots and practices, it will have to find its possibilities already present within the historical moment. It is this that I fail to see anywhere present. Where are the roots of an other-economy to Capitalism? Where in Capitalism does something new already appear? Or is there, already within Islam, some habit of economy waiting to emerge into explicit and self-conscious rational economic being?

It is for these reasons among others that I maintained in an earlier text that "We are trapped in a conversation with Liberalism which we cannot escape."

And God knows best...


-LoA