Saturday, January 31, 2009
the deeper hole
Catholic bishop, Richard Williamson, apologizes for making his Holocaust-denying-views known to the media and the embarrassment it has caused the Church, but does not repudiate those views or apologize for holding them. See the NYTimes story here.
Friday, January 30, 2009
waking up in the bed you made
The Vatican's Holocaust-Denying-Bishop PR nightmare that just won't end.
Thursday, January 29, 2009
rebuilding the bridges you burned
The Pope tries to normalize the Vatican's relationship with Judaism after last weeks fiasco. I am not sure the words are going to offset the action quite so easily.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
at the fringes of catholicism
In the process of trying to recuperate a fringe conservative group that broke away from the Catholic Church in 1988, the Vatican has landed itself in an even bigger mess. In the process of bringing the SSPX into the fold, the Papacy has also reinstated a Holocaust denier as a bishop. The leaders of the Jewish community in Israel have reacted in precisely the manner one would expect.
Saturday, January 3, 2009
recommended: democracy in iran
Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty, Oxford University Press, 2006: pp.214 + xvii
The issue of Middle Eastern democracy is obviously one that is prominent on the mind of almost anyone who has an interest in politics, international affairs or Islam today. While there are at least a pair of functionally stable elected governments in the region, Israel and Turkey, at least one vision of what the United States hoped to accomplish in Iraq was to bring democracy to that country and begin a wave of democratization to the region so that those democratizing movements would become the natural allies of America in the war on terror. Blame for this failure has regularly pointed to Syria and Iran, and there has been open talk of forcing regime change in Iran.
Gheissari and Nasr’s book attempts to make the case that Iran is already, under its own power, well on its way to democratization, and by implication (though by no means explicitly) suggests that intervention and meddling in Iranian affairs by foreign powers will be counter-productive on this matter. The book traces the political history of Iran through the 20th century focusing on the internal political players and the ebb and flow of those forces. The role of foreign power is acknowledged – the United States, England, the Soviet Union/ Russia, China, etc. – but they only feature as minor characters in the narrative, e.g., the role of the United States in the 1953 coup is mentioned, but not detailed; instead the focus is on the political setting and the tensions that made American intervention possible and outlines who benefited from that intervention.
If foreign players are relegated to minor roles, then, as one might suspect, the major characters in the story are the Pahlavis, the Ulema, the bazaar and to a lesser degree left and liberal intelligentsia. The plot as it is outlined by the authors is simple but compelling. Iran, they argue, is unlike any other colonial or post-colonial state and therefore has a unique dynamic rooted in a very long history and pride concerning its Persian identity and its role as the protector of Shi’a Islam. It is the only country, they argue, to have undergone a genuinely fundamentalist Islamic Revolution and have, since then, passed on to a largely post-fundamentalist position within the culture at large. What has driven Iranian politics through the long twentieth century, which is still underway in Iran insofar as they remain within this dynamic, is the tension between the need to modernize the Iranian state and the need to democratize the state. “Modern Iranian politics has been shaped by the continuous struggle between, on the one hand, the ideals of freedom and rule of law and, on the other, the demand for stability, order, development and the kind of state that can provide them” (23).
From the standpoint of the authors, the official leaders of Iran have been more effective in providing modernization than freedom. And this is no accident. For the Pahlavis, already, it was clear that modernization had to be achieved by a government that could quickly and flexibly act, and thus act in a unilateral manner. Reza Khan quickly consolidated power by demonstrating that given greater authority, given a reinterpretation of the 1906 constitution, he could mobilize the economic resources of the country and achieve substantial improvements in the standard of living, industrial capacity and infrastructure of Iran. Initially this development found support amongst the Ulama, who saw the rise of Reza Khan as a reinstitution of public order, and a protective measure securing the realm of the Shi’a. But ultimately this was not the way in which Reza Khan interpreted himself. The security of Iran lay in modernization, and for this to be accomplished the monarchy needed to assert its autonomy from all forces that would slow it down, including the Ulama.
What made the later Revolution interesting, then, was the extent to which the Revolution, led by the Ulama and supported by the left-intelligentsia, was a revolution against a very successful campaign on the part of the monarchy over a fifty year period (not all of them smooth of course) to improve the economic lives of Iranians. When one administered the Reagan-test, “Are you better off today than you were four years ago?”, the vote should have undoubtedly come down in favor of the Pahlavi-state. Yet, the Revolution did happen and it happened because in the process of achieving this wonderful economic development, the Pahlavi-state lost its ability to represent people of Iran, i.e., the people of Iran did not see the Pahlavis as representing their own concerns.
This can be seen in the manner in which the Revolution rallied around Islam to protest the secular Pahlavi government. This turned out to be much more than a pragmatic stance, and eventually, as we know, Khomeni was able to secure Supreme Leader of the Revolution and the Ulama found itself at the head of the Iranian state. The Revolution then instituted a new set of laws based upon its interpretation of Islam, laws and practices which were enforced by unofficial powers associated with the Revolution and the local mosque.
In many ways, while the Revolution did represent a kind of democratic change in Iran, it, at the same time, set back state building and severely set back economic development. Most obvious, perhaps, is that foreign business was either no longer welcome, or did not feel comfortable investing resources in unstable Iran. But not as obvious was the fact that the Revolution itself developed a kind of allergy to the institutional state and so failed to develop new political bodies to administer revolutionary policies. Instead the mosque worked alongside or, sometimes, in competition with, older political institutions left over from the Pahlavi regime.
Eventually though, after the war with Iraq ended, the Ulama found itself needing to concentrate once again on economic development for a society that had sacrificed a great deal and found itself in dire straits. It was at this point that the Ulama followed the lead of the Pahlavis and began a full-scale consolidation of institutional power, overcoming its allergy to political organization. Yet, interestingly, the authors argue that this did not completely undermine the democratic impulse of the Revolution itself. While the Supreme Leader remained untouchable and unquestionable in his political decisions, nonetheless there was also the organization and gradual spread of democratic elections at the local and national level. This has created a situation, according to the authors, in which the people of Iran now expect and have to a large degree internalized democratic values. The democratization of the Iranian people has been achieved by factions of the Ulama itself (while there are groups within the Ulama that are very resistant to it, including the Supreme Leader). Gheissari and Nasr themselves believe that this can continue and must be allowed to continue, while the pressure against the Ulama by foreign powers, and the threat of military action against Iran, just as during the hard days of the war against Iraq, simply rallies the people, who otherwise wish to see democratic change, around the Ulama in a nationalistic surge.
The book has limits of course, as every such narrative must, and none of them take away from this reader's enjoyment and willingness to recommend the book. For the most part those limits serve to reinforce other aspects of the writing which are very positive. By largely marginalizing the narrative influence of European powers on the development of Iran, the authors in fact are much more capable of providing a picture of the issues internal to Iran as a state, that have contributed to its development. In other words, the authors have, because of their decision, been able to provide a very convincing description of the development and tensions present within the Iranian political consciousness; they have told an Iranian story. Foreign influences are narratively marginalized because they are precisely that in the mind of Iranians: foreign.
The one genuinely problematic limit that I find with the book is the failure, especially in the long introduction, to define democracy. One of the things they emphasize is the variety of ways in which “democracy” has been used in Iran at various times: many of them quite illiberal. But if, as they suggest, the goal in Iran, the necessity in Iran if there is to be a legitimate state, ought to be the promotion of democratic institutions, then it must be made clear what democracy means. Now they are clearly not the only ones to blame. Democracy is a term that is very much thrown around these days without anyone taking the time to define it; everyone relies on its apparent self-evidence and the shared presumption that democracy must be a good thing. But one can fairly ask that two scholars in positions of influence take the time to specify what it is that is truly being sought under the banner of “democracy” in order not simply to help us better understand Iran, but to better understand our own categories of interpretation in a time when that category in particular has become the justification for a great deal of violence and bloodshed.
-LoA
The issue of Middle Eastern democracy is obviously one that is prominent on the mind of almost anyone who has an interest in politics, international affairs or Islam today. While there are at least a pair of functionally stable elected governments in the region, Israel and Turkey, at least one vision of what the United States hoped to accomplish in Iraq was to bring democracy to that country and begin a wave of democratization to the region so that those democratizing movements would become the natural allies of America in the war on terror. Blame for this failure has regularly pointed to Syria and Iran, and there has been open talk of forcing regime change in Iran.
Gheissari and Nasr’s book attempts to make the case that Iran is already, under its own power, well on its way to democratization, and by implication (though by no means explicitly) suggests that intervention and meddling in Iranian affairs by foreign powers will be counter-productive on this matter. The book traces the political history of Iran through the 20th century focusing on the internal political players and the ebb and flow of those forces. The role of foreign power is acknowledged – the United States, England, the Soviet Union/ Russia, China, etc. – but they only feature as minor characters in the narrative, e.g., the role of the United States in the 1953 coup is mentioned, but not detailed; instead the focus is on the political setting and the tensions that made American intervention possible and outlines who benefited from that intervention.
If foreign players are relegated to minor roles, then, as one might suspect, the major characters in the story are the Pahlavis, the Ulema, the bazaar and to a lesser degree left and liberal intelligentsia. The plot as it is outlined by the authors is simple but compelling. Iran, they argue, is unlike any other colonial or post-colonial state and therefore has a unique dynamic rooted in a very long history and pride concerning its Persian identity and its role as the protector of Shi’a Islam. It is the only country, they argue, to have undergone a genuinely fundamentalist Islamic Revolution and have, since then, passed on to a largely post-fundamentalist position within the culture at large. What has driven Iranian politics through the long twentieth century, which is still underway in Iran insofar as they remain within this dynamic, is the tension between the need to modernize the Iranian state and the need to democratize the state. “Modern Iranian politics has been shaped by the continuous struggle between, on the one hand, the ideals of freedom and rule of law and, on the other, the demand for stability, order, development and the kind of state that can provide them” (23).
From the standpoint of the authors, the official leaders of Iran have been more effective in providing modernization than freedom. And this is no accident. For the Pahlavis, already, it was clear that modernization had to be achieved by a government that could quickly and flexibly act, and thus act in a unilateral manner. Reza Khan quickly consolidated power by demonstrating that given greater authority, given a reinterpretation of the 1906 constitution, he could mobilize the economic resources of the country and achieve substantial improvements in the standard of living, industrial capacity and infrastructure of Iran. Initially this development found support amongst the Ulama, who saw the rise of Reza Khan as a reinstitution of public order, and a protective measure securing the realm of the Shi’a. But ultimately this was not the way in which Reza Khan interpreted himself. The security of Iran lay in modernization, and for this to be accomplished the monarchy needed to assert its autonomy from all forces that would slow it down, including the Ulama.
What made the later Revolution interesting, then, was the extent to which the Revolution, led by the Ulama and supported by the left-intelligentsia, was a revolution against a very successful campaign on the part of the monarchy over a fifty year period (not all of them smooth of course) to improve the economic lives of Iranians. When one administered the Reagan-test, “Are you better off today than you were four years ago?”, the vote should have undoubtedly come down in favor of the Pahlavi-state. Yet, the Revolution did happen and it happened because in the process of achieving this wonderful economic development, the Pahlavi-state lost its ability to represent people of Iran, i.e., the people of Iran did not see the Pahlavis as representing their own concerns.
This can be seen in the manner in which the Revolution rallied around Islam to protest the secular Pahlavi government. This turned out to be much more than a pragmatic stance, and eventually, as we know, Khomeni was able to secure Supreme Leader of the Revolution and the Ulama found itself at the head of the Iranian state. The Revolution then instituted a new set of laws based upon its interpretation of Islam, laws and practices which were enforced by unofficial powers associated with the Revolution and the local mosque.
In many ways, while the Revolution did represent a kind of democratic change in Iran, it, at the same time, set back state building and severely set back economic development. Most obvious, perhaps, is that foreign business was either no longer welcome, or did not feel comfortable investing resources in unstable Iran. But not as obvious was the fact that the Revolution itself developed a kind of allergy to the institutional state and so failed to develop new political bodies to administer revolutionary policies. Instead the mosque worked alongside or, sometimes, in competition with, older political institutions left over from the Pahlavi regime.
Eventually though, after the war with Iraq ended, the Ulama found itself needing to concentrate once again on economic development for a society that had sacrificed a great deal and found itself in dire straits. It was at this point that the Ulama followed the lead of the Pahlavis and began a full-scale consolidation of institutional power, overcoming its allergy to political organization. Yet, interestingly, the authors argue that this did not completely undermine the democratic impulse of the Revolution itself. While the Supreme Leader remained untouchable and unquestionable in his political decisions, nonetheless there was also the organization and gradual spread of democratic elections at the local and national level. This has created a situation, according to the authors, in which the people of Iran now expect and have to a large degree internalized democratic values. The democratization of the Iranian people has been achieved by factions of the Ulama itself (while there are groups within the Ulama that are very resistant to it, including the Supreme Leader). Gheissari and Nasr themselves believe that this can continue and must be allowed to continue, while the pressure against the Ulama by foreign powers, and the threat of military action against Iran, just as during the hard days of the war against Iraq, simply rallies the people, who otherwise wish to see democratic change, around the Ulama in a nationalistic surge.
The book has limits of course, as every such narrative must, and none of them take away from this reader's enjoyment and willingness to recommend the book. For the most part those limits serve to reinforce other aspects of the writing which are very positive. By largely marginalizing the narrative influence of European powers on the development of Iran, the authors in fact are much more capable of providing a picture of the issues internal to Iran as a state, that have contributed to its development. In other words, the authors have, because of their decision, been able to provide a very convincing description of the development and tensions present within the Iranian political consciousness; they have told an Iranian story. Foreign influences are narratively marginalized because they are precisely that in the mind of Iranians: foreign.
The one genuinely problematic limit that I find with the book is the failure, especially in the long introduction, to define democracy. One of the things they emphasize is the variety of ways in which “democracy” has been used in Iran at various times: many of them quite illiberal. But if, as they suggest, the goal in Iran, the necessity in Iran if there is to be a legitimate state, ought to be the promotion of democratic institutions, then it must be made clear what democracy means. Now they are clearly not the only ones to blame. Democracy is a term that is very much thrown around these days without anyone taking the time to define it; everyone relies on its apparent self-evidence and the shared presumption that democracy must be a good thing. But one can fairly ask that two scholars in positions of influence take the time to specify what it is that is truly being sought under the banner of “democracy” in order not simply to help us better understand Iran, but to better understand our own categories of interpretation in a time when that category in particular has become the justification for a great deal of violence and bloodshed.
-LoA
Thursday, January 1, 2009
Falsafa and Kalam: Concerning Justice
The discussion ... goes to the source of the dispute between Western and Islamic legal systems: the distinction between reason-based ethics and revelation-based ethics.
-jinnzaman, in comments made at eteraz.org
[This was originally posted on 19 March 2007. A pair of conversations over at Talk Islam (see here and here) have inspired me to repost this, and to link to it from the Talk Islam site. Please note that all links to the original conversation at eteraz.org are now broken, and as such have been removed. -LoA]
In the midst of a very heated discussion last week at eteraz.org concerning the nature of the government one ought to desire, there was another set threads that took up a distinct, but not unrelated discussion concerning the role of reason within theology. Especially since JM made several substantive references to Al-Ghazali, and I made occasional and not-so-substantive references to Al-Farabi, Ibn'Arabi and Ibn'Rushd, the discussion harkened back to a debate that took place during the classical age of Islamic philosophy and the tensions that emerged within Islamic thought after the discovery of Greek philosophy. Falsafa is itself, obviously, a loan word from the Greek and so philosophy was constantly vulnerable to charges of 'innovation' in the Arabic speaking world.
I repost the conversation, as it occurred across several articles, for a pair of reasons. First, it touches upon issues that are dear to me. The call of God, under which we all stand, places us in a position such that we are, unavoidably, often against our own will, pilgrims towards a Truth which exceeds our present moment. Second, I think it is important that the discussion between Philosophy and Theology not be forgotten, because while we certainly do not comprehend God, reason will always reach out to transcend itself toward that which it does not yet know. Moreover how we understand our relationship to the God that becomes manifest in revelation will, unavoidably, shape our understanding of the political realm.
Finally, the term "positive", as it is used here by both JM and myself means "something one experiences as simply a given; having and needing no other justification than its sheer givenness". It is a datum or positum (in the sense that you might posit something, or de-posit money into the bank).
Francisco de Goya, "El Sueño dela Razon Produce Monstruos" (1799) [Etching with Aquatint]
In an ongoing discussion at eteraz.org, Irshad Manji had suggested that the following would need to be inserted into the St. Petersburg declaration in order for it to be signable:
To this jinnzaman (JM) responded with the following brief comment:
I have two questions: (1) Why do you think human rights are universal? (2) What is your definition of justice? Is it one that is based on Islamic sources of legislation such as the Qur'an, Sunnah, etc or do you subject the Islamic source to contemporary Eurocentric ethical systems?
JM followed up this comment shortly thereafter with:
The dis[tinction] is not a false dichotomy, but goes to the source of the dispute between Western and Islamic legal systems: the distinction between reason-based ethics and revelation-based ethics. By contemporary European ethical systems I'm referring to Kantian, Utilitarian, and social contract theories of ethics. By Islamic ethical systems, I'm referring to the theological framework established by the various Kalam schools, the Asharis and Maturidis. The aqeedah of Ahl us Sunnah is that their is nothing that has innate goodness/badness within it; these terms are defined by Allah (subhana wa ta'ala). As such, what is termed as "justice" is not what human beings define as "justice", but rather, what the Creator deems to be "just" since He possesses the attributes of infinite knowledge, foresight, and justice. Thus, when people talk about "reforming" Islam, they usually either inadvertently or intentionally interpolate contemporary Euro-centric ethical views into the classical Islamic traditions. One area of conflict is over this definition of "justice". For Muslims, the central concept of human relationships with one another as well as their Creator is the concept of submission to the Creator, not liberty. In other words, all ethical obligations and rights are granted or taken from the Creator. Thus, asking questions such as: what is the definition of justice, and whether human rights are truly "universal" and on what grounds other than tautology, syllogism, or social contract theory, are entirely pertinent questions.
This pair of comments, combined with JM's post entitled "Firestorm" which outlined a political vision of the Islamic world that was (for me at least) disturbingly close to the failed and destructive policies of the '79-Revolution led me to respond and defend the rights of falsafa. I, of necessity, speak as a non-Muslim; I am Christian. But the issues raised here have such bearing on how one understands the relation between revelation and reason, how one must do theology, and the relationship between God and the world, that they cross the divide between all of us who believe in the God of Abraham and unite us in a common conversation. This is not, then, a conversation about whether or not God has revealed Godself, but a matter of humanity’s disposition in the face of the God who reveals.
Reason itself must be a divine creation and therefore oriented toward God and so there can be no strong divide between philosophy and theology. Second, even if we were to accept some sort of rigorous distinction between reason and revelation, one can only know revelation by way of reason. One needs reason to understand what it says. this would mean at the very least that even if reason could not by its own power provide any knowledge of what was good it would at least have to provide a formal structure by which something could be known: reason would be the power to know and if something was to be known it would have to conform to the human capacity for knowledge. this raises two points: 1. this actually brings you very close to Kant; 2. even an analysis of the conditions of knowledge can actually tell you quite a bit about what revelation must be, what God must be and who humanity must be in order to conform to the formal structures of reason. Third, a position which strongly separates revelation from reason actually contributes to and helps maintain a strong understanding of the secular and thus the types of "justice" and "liberty" which are meant to be denied by a pure theology are going to be reinforced by theology's insistence that it remain pure. The other side of that is this: to separate knowledge of God from human knowledge really leaves God an unknowable and arbitrary power undermining any hope of union or reconciliation with God. There is nothing but submission to a tyrant for no other reason than fear of its power.
This prompted JM's reply:
Firstly, where did you get the impression that Muslims treat reason itself with disdain? What we're discussi[ng] are rational systems, not reason itself. Criticizing deontology or utilitarianism doesn't make one irrational, especially when a person is doing so on purely rational grounds. My point is that before applying these ethical systems to Islam, they need to be substantiated on independent grounds. This request isn't a denial of reason, but an assertion of rational justification.
Secondly, reason is a divine creation, but so are base desires, which are nonetheless prohibited in Islamic jurisrpudence as a source of morality. The question needs to be asked: why should reason be used as a source for ethics in the first place? What type of reasoning are you referring to: rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, dialectical materialism, science, etc. Islamic theology incorporates rationalism, empiricism, and possibly pragmaticism, as well as mystical tendencies. It is as equally valid a tradition as Western reasoning is, although it is definitely distinct. Just because Muslim theologians came to different conclusions from Western philosophers does not make them irrational. The dispute itself is over how we reason and which type of rational conclusions are utilized in moral judgments. Second, with regards to the argument that reasoning must be used for relevation, again, I would ask you what you mean by "reasoning" and why do you think its a basis for understanding revelation. The Qur'an is a self-extrapolating document. One doesn't need to be a philosopher to engage in basic statutory interpretation. The issue is whether the direct positive commands of an infinitely knowledgeable being can be properly comprehended by beings that are finite in their existence in knowledge. Muslims believe that God is suprrational, not irrational. In other words, they believe God is beyond reasoning and we might not always understand His reasoning. This is why His explicit and unambiguous statements are taken as positive commands. So while reason is utilized to understand the texts themselves, they cannot possibly understand the legislator's intent aside from a basic hermeneutical analysis.
I'm not sure about your third position and whether you've substantiated it so I'm going to ask you lay more foundation. Terms like "good", "evil", "justice" and "injustice" are defined by the Creator. Things are not good/evil in and of themsleves. Justice is not a quantifiable property; it is not a physical characteristic of a material object, it defines human behavior. If the moon crashes into the sun and gets obliterated, this might be a catastrophic event, but it is not 'evil' or 'unjust'. These terms are moral judgments and again, this goes to the question of how moral judgments are made. For Muslims, the source of our ethics is from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) and revealed texts. Western ethics are based on certain pressupositions that ultimately get reduced to metphaysical assumptions that are ultimately tautological. If they are tautological, then an opposite statement is equally valid. There are no ethical or philosophical grounds by which Westerners can criticize Islamic ethics, otherwise an equally valid right exists for Muslims to criticize Western ethics.
The Islamic conception of God is one of infinite knowledge, power, justice, but also of infinite concern with humanity. his legislation is there for the ultimate benefit of humanity in this life and the next, even if we don't comprehend it. The goal of paradise is not merely physical pleasure, but being in the company of the creator. So, I don't really buy this whole idea of God being tyrannical. It simply is not possible for a human being with finite knowledge and limited sensory perception to comprehend a being with infinite knowledge. separation is a necessity, not an option.
Lastly, the ultimate purpose of rights and liberty from either a deontological or utilitarian perspective is to promote autonomy. Autonomy is defined as the promotion of volition and the negation of forces of coercion. Western political philosophy focuses on developing measures to prevent external measures but fails to take into account that human beings have innate trends that infringe upon their own autonomy. For Muslims, coercion is external but also internal as well. Islamic law rejects the base self (nafs) as a source of legislation and ethics. Personally speaking, irrespective of my religious views, I agree with this conclusion.
Before getting to the larger response, I think it is important to note that one has to accept this criticism of "foundationalism" if, by that term, JM means that humanity possesses some sort of sure and secure standpoint, of itself, by which it is capable of judging the truth of things, the truth of revelation even, for itself. I have no desire to deny this criticism of foundationalism. Our whole being is experienced in its gratuity and the Truth itself comes in freedom (which should not be confused with choice between two options). But this is merely to say that our being is directed beyond itself, towards God, who is All-in-All.
I want very much to be clear: I did not say that Muslims treated Reason with disdain. I was specifically being critical of the position you articulated. The position you are espousing is not specifically Muslim, nor is it by any means the position of Islam as a whole. You certainly find versions of it among Christians and others. The real dilemma is that the contrast between a "reason-based ethic" and a "revelation-based ethic" is problematic from the start because the so-called revelation-based ethic is always going to be dependent on reason, for, at the very least, both its acceptance and its interpretation: which is precisely what the contrast is meant to disallow. Nor do i have any desire to deny the appeal and rationality of the various traditions within Islam. No tradition can have the broad appeal and the ability to organize cultures, nations, peoples, the ability to generate amazing works of mathematics, philosophy, architecture, the arts etc, and not provide a compellingly rational account of the world. Though my knowledge of Islam is quite limited, i have nothing but respect for al-Farabi and al-Arabi, with whom i am somewhat familiar and for that matter do not understand them to be so far removed from many of their non-Muslim counterparts. But i don't think either you or I believe they are all "equally valid …tradition[s]", otherwise it would be a matter of indifference how we aligned ourselves with respect to the various traditions. The fact that i cannot help but orient myself toward God in one away, rather than another, means that for all my respect for (and in some cases lack of respect for) other traditions, i find them less adequate, compelling, promising, etc. They lack rationality for me, somehow, to an extent that i cannot embrace them as my own. There are reasons, for instance, why you are not Presbyterian!
The crux of the matter here is that Reason is always in play, always at work. to make an appeal to that which is beyond Reason as providing an unassailable truth is to leave the bounds of meaningful conversation. I can only understand the claims of texts like the Qur'an or the Bible insofar as they make an appeal to me. This is not to say that the texts ought to be philosophical, but the claims that those texts make on us in the end demand a judgment: will we embrace them as our own, or no? The fact that we are finite beings points to reality that the discussion over the Truth is not yet closed, has not yet reached its completion and is not yet fully known. Once again, if it were, there would be no need for this discussion. also once again, this is not to deny that one always finds one tradition more adequate in pursuing the Truth, but the Truth has not yet been fully realized. One is still in the troublesome position of having to make judgments.
The appeal to the infinity of the divine is the way in which many of us, including myself, talk about the brokenness of our own self-understandings, the incompleteness of any account that one might try to give of the human person in the present moment. It is essential to the way in which we talk about the fact that we desire to be more and other than we are, that we desire to transcend ourselves; we desire ecstasy; we desire to be Whole.
On the other hand the appeal to the infinity of God cannot be a way of short-circuiting Reason and the way in which it guides us in all that we do. Reason always extends itself to that which it encounters as merely positive, in order to incorporate, understand and judge it. You attempt to reduce Reason to a purely hermeneutic faculty with respect to revelation. But Reason will not allow itself to be so limited. Already, under such conditions, Reason will run ahead of the experience of revelation and set the conditions by which any such thing can be given. Revelation will have to present itself in the same way as any other object; any positive revelation, 'revealed religion' as the nineteenth century thinkers were fond of calling it, will have to enter into and become a part of the world of objects. At the moment it does this it becomes part of Reason's drive to grasp the world in its completeness. Likewise Reason will run ahead of any discourse and set the conditions. Experience, even the experience of revelation, must manifest itself to us, to specific kinds of knowers at a specific time and place.
Moreover, by even granting that there is such as space that belongs to revelation alone, over against Reason, which would apparently be left to go off and construct regions of human inquiry like mathematics and biology, one creates the very divide by which the secular arises. The secular becomes the space of merely human endeavor. In allowing the secular to arise in such a way, one actually reinforces the social and political conditions that allow liberalism and capitalism. Instead we must insist that it is precisely through the cultural discussions we have, which include arguments over the meaning of terms like "justice", "good", "liberty", "freedom" that we are entering into a discussion over the nature of humanity and its life toward God. We are concerned with human wholeness. This allows no space for the secular - a position with which i suspect you are sympathetic. It is precisely by denying the split between reason and revelation, by tying the two inextricably together, by insisting that the human person cannot be so schizophrenically divided, that one is in a position to criticize the dehumanizing effects of liberal life.
And this has bearing on the point concerning the arbitrariness of God. If God is conceived as that which is so other that Reason cannot go there, that the commands of God must be accepted merely as something positive, then humanity finds itself in the grip of a tyrant. We obey, not because we experience the commands as the truth of who we are, or even as Truth, but because we are at the mercy of that which threatens to overwhelm us. You push the understanding of God in this direction when you insist that "good", "justice", "evil", "injustice" etc. are entirely dependent on the meaning which they are given by the creator: that they do not have inherent meaning: that, somehow, to say Good and Justice is not also to say God and the Infinite, with all the problems involved therein.
If, when you said that these terms of no meaning in themselves you simply meant that of ourselves we are nothing, I certainly would not argue. But this still does not break the connection between Reason and the divine since insofar as we are we are from God. And, moreover, insofar as we are, our rationality drives us back towards that which is beyond all existence: the All in All.
Given some understanding of creation, I am not sure that Islam, any more than Christianity, can allow that any of our desires are truly base. Certainly we often direct our desires towards inadequate ends, but we are, as whole persons, desirous of the Good which is God. I am not sure what exactly one means when one says that these desires are not a source of ethics. As I understand it (and, i stress that my understanding of Islam is quite limited) the 'nafs' indicate precisely the lack of light, the misdirection and deformation of the will and thus that desire is not correctly ordered and illuminated. In this case it is not that one rejects an analysis of human desire in ethics or politics, but that one criticizes the inadequacy of certain desires. Surely the satisfaction of basic material and physical necessities is fundamental to any account of a just society as well as individual concern for other persons. And one moves on from there to try to satisfy higher order desires.
The very limitations to being human, to which you are sensitive in stressing the need for revelation, are the very reason it is important to remain with Reason. It is there that the Truth is manifest. It is the reason we struggle. It is why there is theology and philosophy. Human beings desire the Whole.
At this point the conversation came full circle and we turned to a discussion of how one might go about understanding what it is we mean when we say "Justice". Another defender of Kalam, Saif, stepped in at this point. His contribution is important in that it shows there is more at stake here that has been shown so far. The attempts of falsafa to defend itself against the critiques of Kalam, do not only bear of the status of Reason, but also address the question of whether or not time and History must be treated as real aspects of humanity and thus of God's manifestation to humanity.
I think that there needs to be a separation of God's law and the application of God's law to a particular case. Shariah is man's best attempt at application of Allah's law in my opinion.
Whatever you may say, shariah does not only apply to the individual. History and the Quran testify to this. I don't advocate allowing adultery at the state level. I don't advocate allowing homosexuality at the state level. I don't advocate allowing anti-Islamic things. Now it is time to use a cliche statement: "No person is an island." Every human being has an effect on other human beings. Granted, these days with no Islamic leader there is no one to apply the Shariah, so we are left with applying it to ourselves. I don't think that this means classifying the Shariah as only applying to the individual.
I'm just wondering...since when are the literal interpretations of Quran and Sunnah unjust? I am completely against calling them unjust. The prophet used these punishments, but in a different context, and he was definitely not unjust. How does justice change over time? Are we some new human race 1400 years later? No. If you want to base leniency on the mercy that the Prophet practiced and encouraged, then I'm ok with that.
….
Innovation is external. The essence of the human being, his soul, is the same. If I was transplanted to 1400 years in the past as a baby and was raised 1400 years in the past as a baby, I'd fit in 1400 years in the past with no problem. I think the same is true if someone from the past was transplanted to today.
The human being did not change at all. All that changed were the external conditions in which the human was raised. Does that mean that our external conditions define who we are, and we should do nothing except adapt to them? I don't think so...we should play an active role in shaping the external contidions to what we see as fit, what we as human beings define as right, which for Muslims are Allah's commands. We have a will...we can do it.
I don't think that chaos and needless suffering is the goal. What is unislamic about technology, about science, etc.? What is unislamic about certain types of clothes, aside from a lack of modesty? Nothing. There is no purpose in wearing 7th century Arab clothing today. There are many things in this world that are not right though, and Islam, the essence of Islam, should not take a backseat role only if everyone else does it. We have a responsibility to right.
Yes, warfare has changed. Powerful countries drop nuclear bombs and develop them while advocating nucear nonproliferation. Rich countries declare war, drop bombs, cause chaos, and then decide to leave. Thousands if not millions of soldiers and civilians die needlessly, for nothing more than powerhungry rulers who they foolishly swear allegience; soldiers do not fight in the name of their ideals. Wars are not fought in the name of justice, but greed. Even worse, a war in the name of greed of money or power is hypocritically fought in the name of justice. All is not well with the world today. I think that the world is getting worse day by day, not better.
In defense of falsafa I replied:
Saif responded briefly with:
No, what I said is the essence of a human being is the same, that a "human being" is a timeless reality. The only differences come from the conditions in which we are raised. I didn't state what I meant clearly when I said that culture was an external... I forgot to mention that culture is internalized...that is why I said to transplant a baby to the past. If people 1400 years ago are so different from us today, then what about a man born in a village vs. a man born in the city. What about a man born in the US vs. a man born in a very poor country? Are they completely different people? Is there a different definition of justice for both of them, or is there one definition of justice? I'm not advocating going back to 7th century arabia and using all of the laws from there. I'm saying that justice does not change between times. There is an eternal definition of justice. There is a such thing as right and wrong...they are not relative. All that can be done today is try to apply the ideal of justice to whatever situation we find ourselves in today.
Insisting upon the real historical nature of human being and rationality, I replied:
Obviously, justice then and justice now are two different things. Just look at the way visual representations of justice have transformed if nothing else. While courthouses regularly have statuary of blind-justice (justice with her eyes covered by a blindfold), such a representation would have been non-sensical or representative of a failure of justice in the middle ages.
Ideals are hardly eternal; they are instead deeply connected with the practices of the communities of which they are a part. one can think of the way in which ideals of marriage or love have changed over...the last century...not to mention 1400 years. And I suspect, even as it is within Christianity, that it is very difficult to talk about the human essence or human nature within Islam, because of the doctrine of creation. Essence or nature usually refers some quality of a thing taken on its own. The essence is what divides it from everything else. But in and of ourselves human beings are nothing, we only are insofar as we are from God...and even in that [our] being does not find its end in itself, but must exceed itself, back towards God who is beyond all being.
And what else, but that can you possibly mean when you say that we try to apply the ideal of justice to this or that situation than that we try to live our lives towards the divine? To desire Justice is to desire God. Our traditions are the continued attempts to overcome our brokenness and find Justice, the Good, etc.
All of this is not to say there is no continuity between us and our past. We can only have gotten here from there. But history happens as humanity struggles for wholeness.
This brought JM back into the conversation on behalf of Kalam with a very thoughtful and articulate statement of what was at stake in his understanding of justice:
Let's start defining terms like "justice", "autonomy", "good", "evil".
As I stated before, the interpretation of the term "justice" from a Western perspective and an Islamic perspective is different. Both Sunnis and Shias believe that the Shari'ah is inherently just because they emanate from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) who is all-knowing and infinitely just.
The benefits/burdens of ahkam are not limited to the material world, but include the benefits/burdens accrued in the hereafter, which are greater than this world. Unlike previous Prophets, Rasulullah (sallahu alayhi wa sallam) was a universal prophet who was to deliver the message of Allah to all of mankind until the day of judgment. Thus, his commands and those contained in the Qur'an are presumed to be binding unless shown otherwise.
When I say "Islamic" conception of justice, as opposed to Western, I'm referring to the formalized opinions of experts in Islamic theology. For Ahl us Sunnah waal Jam'ah, this would refer to the Atharis, as well as the two schools of Kalam compromised of the Asharis and the Maturidis. For Shiat ul-Ali, this would refer to the aqeedah developed by their scholars that is similar to the Mu'tazila. Clearly, the claim that 'there's no distinction between Western and Islamic conceptions of justice' is merely a claim that requires substantion. Although their may be some overlap in these terms, they have different roots. The underlying roots, by which rational and moral judgments are made, in Islam is revelation. Rational arguments may be persuasive, but not mandatory. Conversely, Western philosophers don't take revealed texts as the exclusive source of rational and judgments. Revealed texts is persuasive, not mandatory proof. Claiming that there's no difference between Western philosophers and Islamic theologians is a tautological statement in the absence of proof.
According to Ahl us Sunnah waal Jam'ah, the definition of justice can be divided between substantive and procedural justice. Substantively speaking, the ultimate source of our understanding of justice comes from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) who has the attributes of being all-knowing, infinitely just, etc. Islamic law in this sense, adopts a legal positivist approach: laws from the creator are not in and of themselves independently just, but are just because the Creator Himself commanded it and since He is infinitely just, His pronouncements, commands, and prohibitions, are all just as well. I think the problem you're having is that, whether you recognize it or not, you've adopted a sort of platonic conception of justice. Justice is not a physical property of material objects. It cannot be measured, quantified, added or subtracted in a laboratory. Things are good because God says they are good and things are bad because God says they are bad. For example, for Iblis, prostration to Adam (alayhi sallam) was an obligation. However, in the time of the Prophet Muhammad (sallahu alayhi wa sallam) to anyone other than Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) was forbidden. Prostration in and of itself is not good or bad. It was good/obligatory in the time of Iblis and it was bad/prohibited in the time of the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam). Now, the punishment for committing theft or adultery are deemed obligatory in the Shari'ah according to the fuqaha. These punishments are substantively just because they are the direct commands of Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) or the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam). Had Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) commanded Ibrahim (alayhi sallam) to sacrifice Ishmael (alyahi sallam), then this would have been just and if He commanded its opposite, it would have been obligatory as well. Now, this might seem contradictory, but the law of non-contradiction doesn't necessarily apply to the Creator. Amongst the Asharis who wrote about this, Imam Juwawyni held the opinion that God is not subject to the dictates of the human intellect. In other words, Muslim theologians recognized that the finite human intellect, like the angels who questioned the creation of mankind in the first place, can not comprehend the will of the Creator who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and infinitely just. God is not irrational, but He is suprarational; beyond reason and comprehension. The perfect example of this is in the case of the narrative of Khidr and Musa (alaihi mus sallam). In this story, Musa tagged along with Khidr (alaihi mus sallam) in order to acquire spiritual knowledge. Khidr (alayhi sallam) (1) sunk a ship, (2) collapsed a wall, and (3) killed a child. Musa (alayhi sallam) objected to each of these because, from his perspective, they were apparently unjust. Khidr (alayhi sallam), however, had knowledge of the future as well and explained that their were reasons why he engaged in those particular actions. Musa (alayhi sallam) didn't have knowledge of these future events and thus, his conception of justice was limited to particular temporal and spatial restrictions. The point of the narrative is that we as humans might not be able to fully comprehend why things may be prohibited or obligatory. Allah (subhana wa ta'ala), being infinitely knowledgeable, does not possess the limitations which human beings possess.
To elaborate further, the fuqaha have stated that their are various conceptions of the purposes of the Shari'ah. According to Imam Shatibi, the goals of the underlying objectives of the Shari'ah were the promotion of (1) faith, (2) property, (3) family, (4) intellect, and and (5) life. Perhaps the term "objectives" is misleading, a better term might be "rationalizations" because one does not base one's rulings on Maqasid al Shari'ah, but one follows the methodologies laid forth in one's usul al fiqh and maqasid is used more in areas where their is ijtehad. Of course, one can absolve a legal ruling based upon overriding concerns, but this is usually in the case of exigent circumstances, not a general practice.
For example, the consumption of alcohol diminishes control of one's intellect. People lose control of their volition and are more prone to making bad decisions. Some times they destroy property, which impinges upon another maqasid of the Shari'ah. Other times, they may engage in fornication, and this impinges on the maqasid of promoting the preservation of the family. Other times, they may get into fights, which may result in the taking of life, another concern of the Shari'ah. The underlying reason, however, why the consumption of alcohol is prohibited is because Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) commanded it. It can be understood by rationalizing it, but the rationalization cannot supersede the literal conclusive proofs if they constitute an amr that constitutes an obligation in the absense of mitigating proof. As you can see, these things, when applied, promote harmony in society. However, the benefits from the implentation of the Shari'ah are incidental, not fundamental, to the conception of justice.
However, substantive justice isn't the only aspect of justice that emanates from Islamic law, there is also procedural justice as well. In other words, the punishment of a crime may in and of itself be unjust even though the declaration of a particular action to be criminal is just. The perfect example of this is the punishment for adultery, which requires four witnesses that actually see the act of penetration. Unfortunately, some so-called Islamic republics or states today implement the Hadd substantively, but fail to properly understand the procedural requirements. Mufti Taqi Usmani wrote an extensive article explaining this distinction in an article where he dealt with a lot of misunderstandings that people had with the Hudood Ordinances in Pakistan. In reality, one must look at the totality of the circumstances. A Qadhi scrutinizes the reliability of each witness, whether they were trustworthy, whether they had the proper faculties to observe the crime, whether their testimony was internally consistent, etc. Furthermore, the Qadhi looks at whether the testimony of each witness was consistent with the testimony of the other witensses, whether their was any collusion, whether it was consistent with the testimony of the accused, whether it was consistent with the forensic and physical evidence, etc. Thus, the punishment of the crime in principle may is just, but the way that the crime is punished may not be.
In addition to substantive and procedural justice, there is personal justice which is treatment of members of society in a just manner. This goes in the topic of adab, akhlaq, and mu'amalat. One must treat one's neighbors, family, elders, woman, children, indigent, sick, orphans, in a just manner by fulfilling their rights. These rights are defined by Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) and the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam).
These are the basic forms of the Islamic conceptions of justice.
For reasons I hope are clear by now, what is concerning, to me, throughout all this is the positivist understanding of the law and justice (and hence revelation as whole) which in fact denigrates the very nature of being human and as such undermines creation.
I think the first thing to note, again questioning the strong division you wish to create between Islam and the West, is that there are plenty of western thinkers who take revelation to be normative (Karl Barth most prominently from the 20th century), and of course there are traditions of legal positivism within the western tradition as well: Carl Schmitt most prominently in the 20th century, and Schmitt is making a come back in a new form in figures like Chantal Mouffe; not coincidentally Schmitt's own legal positivism is theologically based, influenced by the understanding of God and revelation introduced at the 1st Vatican Council (a council which picked its own fight with so-called "secularism"); Schmitt is also the father of contemporary western political theology as well being chief jurist for the Weimar Republic and early in the Third Reich.
Also, continuing to question the strong division between Islam and so-called western thought, you point out that my thought is influenced by Platonism and this is of course true, though in an historicized form: participation (methexis) in the divine is mediated historically. But to say I have Platonic influences again does not constitute a serious breach, in itself, with Islam. It is my appreciation of the Neoplatonic tradition that makes al-Farabi appealing, ibn'Arabi, ibn'Sina; and then of course there is ibn'Rushd who is rolling over in his grave at every word that you write.
I have not, in all this, been trying to argue that there were no differences between various traditions of philosophy and theology in the west and in Islam, merely pointing out that the gap was hardly as deep as you would like it to be. In certain areas there is even convergence. Nor have I ever meant to imply that convergence in things like legal positivism means that Islam was copying European thinkers; instead I am merely pointing out that the understanding of the law that you are articulating is not uniquely Islamic (and for that matter is not the only understanding of the law within Islam). And yes of course it is my idealism or Neoplatonism, as you note elsewhere, that makes me cringe every time you take a positivist line.
And finally, because I have been controlling the shape of this conversation, I end with a brief statement from JM that came in response, and summarized his view…
With regards to the assertion that Islamic law is essentially a legal positivist tradition, I would pretty much agree with that. However, if it advocates legal positivism, it isn't because Western civilization advocated this view, it is an independent conclusion. Again, I have no problem with studying Western philosophy with the recognition that Islamic philosophy is a distinct way of thinking that has its own concerns and deals with certain problems by its own distinct methodologies. While there are similarities, they are still two different paradigms.
-LoA
-jinnzaman, in comments made at eteraz.org
[This was originally posted on 19 March 2007. A pair of conversations over at Talk Islam (see here and here) have inspired me to repost this, and to link to it from the Talk Islam site. Please note that all links to the original conversation at eteraz.org are now broken, and as such have been removed. -LoA]
In the midst of a very heated discussion last week at eteraz.org concerning the nature of the government one ought to desire, there was another set threads that took up a distinct, but not unrelated discussion concerning the role of reason within theology. Especially since JM made several substantive references to Al-Ghazali, and I made occasional and not-so-substantive references to Al-Farabi, Ibn'Arabi and Ibn'Rushd, the discussion harkened back to a debate that took place during the classical age of Islamic philosophy and the tensions that emerged within Islamic thought after the discovery of Greek philosophy. Falsafa is itself, obviously, a loan word from the Greek and so philosophy was constantly vulnerable to charges of 'innovation' in the Arabic speaking world.
I repost the conversation, as it occurred across several articles, for a pair of reasons. First, it touches upon issues that are dear to me. The call of God, under which we all stand, places us in a position such that we are, unavoidably, often against our own will, pilgrims towards a Truth which exceeds our present moment. Second, I think it is important that the discussion between Philosophy and Theology not be forgotten, because while we certainly do not comprehend God, reason will always reach out to transcend itself toward that which it does not yet know. Moreover how we understand our relationship to the God that becomes manifest in revelation will, unavoidably, shape our understanding of the political realm.
Finally, the term "positive", as it is used here by both JM and myself means "something one experiences as simply a given; having and needing no other justification than its sheer givenness". It is a datum or positum (in the sense that you might posit something, or de-posit money into the bank).
Francisco de Goya, "El Sueño dela Razon Produce Monstruos" (1799) [Etching with Aquatint]
In an ongoing discussion at eteraz.org, Irshad Manji had suggested that the following would need to be inserted into the St. Petersburg declaration in order for it to be signable:
“Practicing Muslims are an integral and valuable part of the global community, as well as essential to any movement for secular, faith-respecting states that work toward universal human rights. We acknowledge the peaceful observance of Islam to be a legitimate choice for many. We stand by those who embrace an Islam that defends critical thinking, empathy, justice, and non-violence. They are our allies, and we are theirs.”
To this jinnzaman (JM) responded with the following brief comment:
I have two questions: (1) Why do you think human rights are universal? (2) What is your definition of justice? Is it one that is based on Islamic sources of legislation such as the Qur'an, Sunnah, etc or do you subject the Islamic source to contemporary Eurocentric ethical systems?
JM followed up this comment shortly thereafter with:
The dis[tinction] is not a false dichotomy, but goes to the source of the dispute between Western and Islamic legal systems: the distinction between reason-based ethics and revelation-based ethics. By contemporary European ethical systems I'm referring to Kantian, Utilitarian, and social contract theories of ethics. By Islamic ethical systems, I'm referring to the theological framework established by the various Kalam schools, the Asharis and Maturidis. The aqeedah of Ahl us Sunnah is that their is nothing that has innate goodness/badness within it; these terms are defined by Allah (subhana wa ta'ala). As such, what is termed as "justice" is not what human beings define as "justice", but rather, what the Creator deems to be "just" since He possesses the attributes of infinite knowledge, foresight, and justice. Thus, when people talk about "reforming" Islam, they usually either inadvertently or intentionally interpolate contemporary Euro-centric ethical views into the classical Islamic traditions. One area of conflict is over this definition of "justice". For Muslims, the central concept of human relationships with one another as well as their Creator is the concept of submission to the Creator, not liberty. In other words, all ethical obligations and rights are granted or taken from the Creator. Thus, asking questions such as: what is the definition of justice, and whether human rights are truly "universal" and on what grounds other than tautology, syllogism, or social contract theory, are entirely pertinent questions.
This pair of comments, combined with JM's post entitled "Firestorm" which outlined a political vision of the Islamic world that was (for me at least) disturbingly close to the failed and destructive policies of the '79-Revolution led me to respond and defend the rights of falsafa. I, of necessity, speak as a non-Muslim; I am Christian. But the issues raised here have such bearing on how one understands the relation between revelation and reason, how one must do theology, and the relationship between God and the world, that they cross the divide between all of us who believe in the God of Abraham and unite us in a common conversation. This is not, then, a conversation about whether or not God has revealed Godself, but a matter of humanity’s disposition in the face of the God who reveals.
Reason itself must be a divine creation and therefore oriented toward God and so there can be no strong divide between philosophy and theology. Second, even if we were to accept some sort of rigorous distinction between reason and revelation, one can only know revelation by way of reason. One needs reason to understand what it says. this would mean at the very least that even if reason could not by its own power provide any knowledge of what was good it would at least have to provide a formal structure by which something could be known: reason would be the power to know and if something was to be known it would have to conform to the human capacity for knowledge. this raises two points: 1. this actually brings you very close to Kant; 2. even an analysis of the conditions of knowledge can actually tell you quite a bit about what revelation must be, what God must be and who humanity must be in order to conform to the formal structures of reason. Third, a position which strongly separates revelation from reason actually contributes to and helps maintain a strong understanding of the secular and thus the types of "justice" and "liberty" which are meant to be denied by a pure theology are going to be reinforced by theology's insistence that it remain pure. The other side of that is this: to separate knowledge of God from human knowledge really leaves God an unknowable and arbitrary power undermining any hope of union or reconciliation with God. There is nothing but submission to a tyrant for no other reason than fear of its power.
This prompted JM's reply:
Firstly, where did you get the impression that Muslims treat reason itself with disdain? What we're discussi[ng] are rational systems, not reason itself. Criticizing deontology or utilitarianism doesn't make one irrational, especially when a person is doing so on purely rational grounds. My point is that before applying these ethical systems to Islam, they need to be substantiated on independent grounds. This request isn't a denial of reason, but an assertion of rational justification.
Secondly, reason is a divine creation, but so are base desires, which are nonetheless prohibited in Islamic jurisrpudence as a source of morality. The question needs to be asked: why should reason be used as a source for ethics in the first place? What type of reasoning are you referring to: rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, dialectical materialism, science, etc. Islamic theology incorporates rationalism, empiricism, and possibly pragmaticism, as well as mystical tendencies. It is as equally valid a tradition as Western reasoning is, although it is definitely distinct. Just because Muslim theologians came to different conclusions from Western philosophers does not make them irrational. The dispute itself is over how we reason and which type of rational conclusions are utilized in moral judgments. Second, with regards to the argument that reasoning must be used for relevation, again, I would ask you what you mean by "reasoning" and why do you think its a basis for understanding revelation. The Qur'an is a self-extrapolating document. One doesn't need to be a philosopher to engage in basic statutory interpretation. The issue is whether the direct positive commands of an infinitely knowledgeable being can be properly comprehended by beings that are finite in their existence in knowledge. Muslims believe that God is suprrational, not irrational. In other words, they believe God is beyond reasoning and we might not always understand His reasoning. This is why His explicit and unambiguous statements are taken as positive commands. So while reason is utilized to understand the texts themselves, they cannot possibly understand the legislator's intent aside from a basic hermeneutical analysis.
I'm not sure about your third position and whether you've substantiated it so I'm going to ask you lay more foundation. Terms like "good", "evil", "justice" and "injustice" are defined by the Creator. Things are not good/evil in and of themsleves. Justice is not a quantifiable property; it is not a physical characteristic of a material object, it defines human behavior. If the moon crashes into the sun and gets obliterated, this might be a catastrophic event, but it is not 'evil' or 'unjust'. These terms are moral judgments and again, this goes to the question of how moral judgments are made. For Muslims, the source of our ethics is from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) and revealed texts. Western ethics are based on certain pressupositions that ultimately get reduced to metphaysical assumptions that are ultimately tautological. If they are tautological, then an opposite statement is equally valid. There are no ethical or philosophical grounds by which Westerners can criticize Islamic ethics, otherwise an equally valid right exists for Muslims to criticize Western ethics.
The Islamic conception of God is one of infinite knowledge, power, justice, but also of infinite concern with humanity. his legislation is there for the ultimate benefit of humanity in this life and the next, even if we don't comprehend it. The goal of paradise is not merely physical pleasure, but being in the company of the creator. So, I don't really buy this whole idea of God being tyrannical. It simply is not possible for a human being with finite knowledge and limited sensory perception to comprehend a being with infinite knowledge. separation is a necessity, not an option.
Lastly, the ultimate purpose of rights and liberty from either a deontological or utilitarian perspective is to promote autonomy. Autonomy is defined as the promotion of volition and the negation of forces of coercion. Western political philosophy focuses on developing measures to prevent external measures but fails to take into account that human beings have innate trends that infringe upon their own autonomy. For Muslims, coercion is external but also internal as well. Islamic law rejects the base self (nafs) as a source of legislation and ethics. Personally speaking, irrespective of my religious views, I agree with this conclusion.
Before getting to the larger response, I think it is important to note that one has to accept this criticism of "foundationalism" if, by that term, JM means that humanity possesses some sort of sure and secure standpoint, of itself, by which it is capable of judging the truth of things, the truth of revelation even, for itself. I have no desire to deny this criticism of foundationalism. Our whole being is experienced in its gratuity and the Truth itself comes in freedom (which should not be confused with choice between two options). But this is merely to say that our being is directed beyond itself, towards God, who is All-in-All.
I want very much to be clear: I did not say that Muslims treated Reason with disdain. I was specifically being critical of the position you articulated. The position you are espousing is not specifically Muslim, nor is it by any means the position of Islam as a whole. You certainly find versions of it among Christians and others. The real dilemma is that the contrast between a "reason-based ethic" and a "revelation-based ethic" is problematic from the start because the so-called revelation-based ethic is always going to be dependent on reason, for, at the very least, both its acceptance and its interpretation: which is precisely what the contrast is meant to disallow. Nor do i have any desire to deny the appeal and rationality of the various traditions within Islam. No tradition can have the broad appeal and the ability to organize cultures, nations, peoples, the ability to generate amazing works of mathematics, philosophy, architecture, the arts etc, and not provide a compellingly rational account of the world. Though my knowledge of Islam is quite limited, i have nothing but respect for al-Farabi and al-Arabi, with whom i am somewhat familiar and for that matter do not understand them to be so far removed from many of their non-Muslim counterparts. But i don't think either you or I believe they are all "equally valid …tradition[s]", otherwise it would be a matter of indifference how we aligned ourselves with respect to the various traditions. The fact that i cannot help but orient myself toward God in one away, rather than another, means that for all my respect for (and in some cases lack of respect for) other traditions, i find them less adequate, compelling, promising, etc. They lack rationality for me, somehow, to an extent that i cannot embrace them as my own. There are reasons, for instance, why you are not Presbyterian!
The crux of the matter here is that Reason is always in play, always at work. to make an appeal to that which is beyond Reason as providing an unassailable truth is to leave the bounds of meaningful conversation. I can only understand the claims of texts like the Qur'an or the Bible insofar as they make an appeal to me. This is not to say that the texts ought to be philosophical, but the claims that those texts make on us in the end demand a judgment: will we embrace them as our own, or no? The fact that we are finite beings points to reality that the discussion over the Truth is not yet closed, has not yet reached its completion and is not yet fully known. Once again, if it were, there would be no need for this discussion. also once again, this is not to deny that one always finds one tradition more adequate in pursuing the Truth, but the Truth has not yet been fully realized. One is still in the troublesome position of having to make judgments.
The appeal to the infinity of the divine is the way in which many of us, including myself, talk about the brokenness of our own self-understandings, the incompleteness of any account that one might try to give of the human person in the present moment. It is essential to the way in which we talk about the fact that we desire to be more and other than we are, that we desire to transcend ourselves; we desire ecstasy; we desire to be Whole.
On the other hand the appeal to the infinity of God cannot be a way of short-circuiting Reason and the way in which it guides us in all that we do. Reason always extends itself to that which it encounters as merely positive, in order to incorporate, understand and judge it. You attempt to reduce Reason to a purely hermeneutic faculty with respect to revelation. But Reason will not allow itself to be so limited. Already, under such conditions, Reason will run ahead of the experience of revelation and set the conditions by which any such thing can be given. Revelation will have to present itself in the same way as any other object; any positive revelation, 'revealed religion' as the nineteenth century thinkers were fond of calling it, will have to enter into and become a part of the world of objects. At the moment it does this it becomes part of Reason's drive to grasp the world in its completeness. Likewise Reason will run ahead of any discourse and set the conditions. Experience, even the experience of revelation, must manifest itself to us, to specific kinds of knowers at a specific time and place.
Moreover, by even granting that there is such as space that belongs to revelation alone, over against Reason, which would apparently be left to go off and construct regions of human inquiry like mathematics and biology, one creates the very divide by which the secular arises. The secular becomes the space of merely human endeavor. In allowing the secular to arise in such a way, one actually reinforces the social and political conditions that allow liberalism and capitalism. Instead we must insist that it is precisely through the cultural discussions we have, which include arguments over the meaning of terms like "justice", "good", "liberty", "freedom" that we are entering into a discussion over the nature of humanity and its life toward God. We are concerned with human wholeness. This allows no space for the secular - a position with which i suspect you are sympathetic. It is precisely by denying the split between reason and revelation, by tying the two inextricably together, by insisting that the human person cannot be so schizophrenically divided, that one is in a position to criticize the dehumanizing effects of liberal life.
And this has bearing on the point concerning the arbitrariness of God. If God is conceived as that which is so other that Reason cannot go there, that the commands of God must be accepted merely as something positive, then humanity finds itself in the grip of a tyrant. We obey, not because we experience the commands as the truth of who we are, or even as Truth, but because we are at the mercy of that which threatens to overwhelm us. You push the understanding of God in this direction when you insist that "good", "justice", "evil", "injustice" etc. are entirely dependent on the meaning which they are given by the creator: that they do not have inherent meaning: that, somehow, to say Good and Justice is not also to say God and the Infinite, with all the problems involved therein.
If, when you said that these terms of no meaning in themselves you simply meant that of ourselves we are nothing, I certainly would not argue. But this still does not break the connection between Reason and the divine since insofar as we are we are from God. And, moreover, insofar as we are, our rationality drives us back towards that which is beyond all existence: the All in All.
Given some understanding of creation, I am not sure that Islam, any more than Christianity, can allow that any of our desires are truly base. Certainly we often direct our desires towards inadequate ends, but we are, as whole persons, desirous of the Good which is God. I am not sure what exactly one means when one says that these desires are not a source of ethics. As I understand it (and, i stress that my understanding of Islam is quite limited) the 'nafs' indicate precisely the lack of light, the misdirection and deformation of the will and thus that desire is not correctly ordered and illuminated. In this case it is not that one rejects an analysis of human desire in ethics or politics, but that one criticizes the inadequacy of certain desires. Surely the satisfaction of basic material and physical necessities is fundamental to any account of a just society as well as individual concern for other persons. And one moves on from there to try to satisfy higher order desires.
The very limitations to being human, to which you are sensitive in stressing the need for revelation, are the very reason it is important to remain with Reason. It is there that the Truth is manifest. It is the reason we struggle. It is why there is theology and philosophy. Human beings desire the Whole.
At this point the conversation came full circle and we turned to a discussion of how one might go about understanding what it is we mean when we say "Justice". Another defender of Kalam, Saif, stepped in at this point. His contribution is important in that it shows there is more at stake here that has been shown so far. The attempts of falsafa to defend itself against the critiques of Kalam, do not only bear of the status of Reason, but also address the question of whether or not time and History must be treated as real aspects of humanity and thus of God's manifestation to humanity.
I think that there needs to be a separation of God's law and the application of God's law to a particular case. Shariah is man's best attempt at application of Allah's law in my opinion.
Whatever you may say, shariah does not only apply to the individual. History and the Quran testify to this. I don't advocate allowing adultery at the state level. I don't advocate allowing homosexuality at the state level. I don't advocate allowing anti-Islamic things. Now it is time to use a cliche statement: "No person is an island." Every human being has an effect on other human beings. Granted, these days with no Islamic leader there is no one to apply the Shariah, so we are left with applying it to ourselves. I don't think that this means classifying the Shariah as only applying to the individual.
I'm just wondering...since when are the literal interpretations of Quran and Sunnah unjust? I am completely against calling them unjust. The prophet used these punishments, but in a different context, and he was definitely not unjust. How does justice change over time? Are we some new human race 1400 years later? No. If you want to base leniency on the mercy that the Prophet practiced and encouraged, then I'm ok with that.
….
Innovation is external. The essence of the human being, his soul, is the same. If I was transplanted to 1400 years in the past as a baby and was raised 1400 years in the past as a baby, I'd fit in 1400 years in the past with no problem. I think the same is true if someone from the past was transplanted to today.
The human being did not change at all. All that changed were the external conditions in which the human was raised. Does that mean that our external conditions define who we are, and we should do nothing except adapt to them? I don't think so...we should play an active role in shaping the external contidions to what we see as fit, what we as human beings define as right, which for Muslims are Allah's commands. We have a will...we can do it.
I don't think that chaos and needless suffering is the goal. What is unislamic about technology, about science, etc.? What is unislamic about certain types of clothes, aside from a lack of modesty? Nothing. There is no purpose in wearing 7th century Arab clothing today. There are many things in this world that are not right though, and Islam, the essence of Islam, should not take a backseat role only if everyone else does it. We have a responsibility to right.
Yes, warfare has changed. Powerful countries drop nuclear bombs and develop them while advocating nucear nonproliferation. Rich countries declare war, drop bombs, cause chaos, and then decide to leave. Thousands if not millions of soldiers and civilians die needlessly, for nothing more than powerhungry rulers who they foolishly swear allegience; soldiers do not fight in the name of their ideals. Wars are not fought in the name of justice, but greed. Even worse, a war in the name of greed of money or power is hypocritically fought in the name of justice. All is not well with the world today. I think that the world is getting worse day by day, not better.
In defense of falsafa I replied:
saif said: "If I was transplanted to 1400 years in the past as a baby and was raised 1400 years in the past as a baby, I'd fit in 1400 years in the past with no problem. I think the same is true if someone from the past was transplanted to today. The human being did not change at all. All that changed were the external conditions in which the human was raised."This is pretty much to say that human beings have changed. Culture is not an external. There is no rigorous divide between the individual and its community. 'Human being' is not some timeless reality independent of its historical location as your own statement itself acknowledges. One acts in the time and place in which one is, out of the possibilities given in that situation. This is not the same thing as quiet conformity, it is simply a recognition that the questions and problems facing us today are not the same as those that faced humanity, e.g., 1400 years ago.
Saif responded briefly with:
No, what I said is the essence of a human being is the same, that a "human being" is a timeless reality. The only differences come from the conditions in which we are raised. I didn't state what I meant clearly when I said that culture was an external... I forgot to mention that culture is internalized...that is why I said to transplant a baby to the past. If people 1400 years ago are so different from us today, then what about a man born in a village vs. a man born in the city. What about a man born in the US vs. a man born in a very poor country? Are they completely different people? Is there a different definition of justice for both of them, or is there one definition of justice? I'm not advocating going back to 7th century arabia and using all of the laws from there. I'm saying that justice does not change between times. There is an eternal definition of justice. There is a such thing as right and wrong...they are not relative. All that can be done today is try to apply the ideal of justice to whatever situation we find ourselves in today.
Insisting upon the real historical nature of human being and rationality, I replied:
Obviously, justice then and justice now are two different things. Just look at the way visual representations of justice have transformed if nothing else. While courthouses regularly have statuary of blind-justice (justice with her eyes covered by a blindfold), such a representation would have been non-sensical or representative of a failure of justice in the middle ages.
Ideals are hardly eternal; they are instead deeply connected with the practices of the communities of which they are a part. one can think of the way in which ideals of marriage or love have changed over...the last century...not to mention 1400 years. And I suspect, even as it is within Christianity, that it is very difficult to talk about the human essence or human nature within Islam, because of the doctrine of creation. Essence or nature usually refers some quality of a thing taken on its own. The essence is what divides it from everything else. But in and of ourselves human beings are nothing, we only are insofar as we are from God...and even in that [our] being does not find its end in itself, but must exceed itself, back towards God who is beyond all being.
And what else, but that can you possibly mean when you say that we try to apply the ideal of justice to this or that situation than that we try to live our lives towards the divine? To desire Justice is to desire God. Our traditions are the continued attempts to overcome our brokenness and find Justice, the Good, etc.
All of this is not to say there is no continuity between us and our past. We can only have gotten here from there. But history happens as humanity struggles for wholeness.
This brought JM back into the conversation on behalf of Kalam with a very thoughtful and articulate statement of what was at stake in his understanding of justice:
Let's start defining terms like "justice", "autonomy", "good", "evil".
As I stated before, the interpretation of the term "justice" from a Western perspective and an Islamic perspective is different. Both Sunnis and Shias believe that the Shari'ah is inherently just because they emanate from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) who is all-knowing and infinitely just.
The benefits/burdens of ahkam are not limited to the material world, but include the benefits/burdens accrued in the hereafter, which are greater than this world. Unlike previous Prophets, Rasulullah (sallahu alayhi wa sallam) was a universal prophet who was to deliver the message of Allah to all of mankind until the day of judgment. Thus, his commands and those contained in the Qur'an are presumed to be binding unless shown otherwise.
When I say "Islamic" conception of justice, as opposed to Western, I'm referring to the formalized opinions of experts in Islamic theology. For Ahl us Sunnah waal Jam'ah, this would refer to the Atharis, as well as the two schools of Kalam compromised of the Asharis and the Maturidis. For Shiat ul-Ali, this would refer to the aqeedah developed by their scholars that is similar to the Mu'tazila. Clearly, the claim that 'there's no distinction between Western and Islamic conceptions of justice' is merely a claim that requires substantion. Although their may be some overlap in these terms, they have different roots. The underlying roots, by which rational and moral judgments are made, in Islam is revelation. Rational arguments may be persuasive, but not mandatory. Conversely, Western philosophers don't take revealed texts as the exclusive source of rational and judgments. Revealed texts is persuasive, not mandatory proof. Claiming that there's no difference between Western philosophers and Islamic theologians is a tautological statement in the absence of proof.
According to Ahl us Sunnah waal Jam'ah, the definition of justice can be divided between substantive and procedural justice. Substantively speaking, the ultimate source of our understanding of justice comes from Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) who has the attributes of being all-knowing, infinitely just, etc. Islamic law in this sense, adopts a legal positivist approach: laws from the creator are not in and of themselves independently just, but are just because the Creator Himself commanded it and since He is infinitely just, His pronouncements, commands, and prohibitions, are all just as well. I think the problem you're having is that, whether you recognize it or not, you've adopted a sort of platonic conception of justice. Justice is not a physical property of material objects. It cannot be measured, quantified, added or subtracted in a laboratory. Things are good because God says they are good and things are bad because God says they are bad. For example, for Iblis, prostration to Adam (alayhi sallam) was an obligation. However, in the time of the Prophet Muhammad (sallahu alayhi wa sallam) to anyone other than Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) was forbidden. Prostration in and of itself is not good or bad. It was good/obligatory in the time of Iblis and it was bad/prohibited in the time of the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam). Now, the punishment for committing theft or adultery are deemed obligatory in the Shari'ah according to the fuqaha. These punishments are substantively just because they are the direct commands of Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) or the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam). Had Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) commanded Ibrahim (alayhi sallam) to sacrifice Ishmael (alyahi sallam), then this would have been just and if He commanded its opposite, it would have been obligatory as well. Now, this might seem contradictory, but the law of non-contradiction doesn't necessarily apply to the Creator. Amongst the Asharis who wrote about this, Imam Juwawyni held the opinion that God is not subject to the dictates of the human intellect. In other words, Muslim theologians recognized that the finite human intellect, like the angels who questioned the creation of mankind in the first place, can not comprehend the will of the Creator who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and infinitely just. God is not irrational, but He is suprarational; beyond reason and comprehension. The perfect example of this is in the case of the narrative of Khidr and Musa (alaihi mus sallam). In this story, Musa tagged along with Khidr (alaihi mus sallam) in order to acquire spiritual knowledge. Khidr (alayhi sallam) (1) sunk a ship, (2) collapsed a wall, and (3) killed a child. Musa (alayhi sallam) objected to each of these because, from his perspective, they were apparently unjust. Khidr (alayhi sallam), however, had knowledge of the future as well and explained that their were reasons why he engaged in those particular actions. Musa (alayhi sallam) didn't have knowledge of these future events and thus, his conception of justice was limited to particular temporal and spatial restrictions. The point of the narrative is that we as humans might not be able to fully comprehend why things may be prohibited or obligatory. Allah (subhana wa ta'ala), being infinitely knowledgeable, does not possess the limitations which human beings possess.
To elaborate further, the fuqaha have stated that their are various conceptions of the purposes of the Shari'ah. According to Imam Shatibi, the goals of the underlying objectives of the Shari'ah were the promotion of (1) faith, (2) property, (3) family, (4) intellect, and and (5) life. Perhaps the term "objectives" is misleading, a better term might be "rationalizations" because one does not base one's rulings on Maqasid al Shari'ah, but one follows the methodologies laid forth in one's usul al fiqh and maqasid is used more in areas where their is ijtehad. Of course, one can absolve a legal ruling based upon overriding concerns, but this is usually in the case of exigent circumstances, not a general practice.
For example, the consumption of alcohol diminishes control of one's intellect. People lose control of their volition and are more prone to making bad decisions. Some times they destroy property, which impinges upon another maqasid of the Shari'ah. Other times, they may engage in fornication, and this impinges on the maqasid of promoting the preservation of the family. Other times, they may get into fights, which may result in the taking of life, another concern of the Shari'ah. The underlying reason, however, why the consumption of alcohol is prohibited is because Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) commanded it. It can be understood by rationalizing it, but the rationalization cannot supersede the literal conclusive proofs if they constitute an amr that constitutes an obligation in the absense of mitigating proof. As you can see, these things, when applied, promote harmony in society. However, the benefits from the implentation of the Shari'ah are incidental, not fundamental, to the conception of justice.
However, substantive justice isn't the only aspect of justice that emanates from Islamic law, there is also procedural justice as well. In other words, the punishment of a crime may in and of itself be unjust even though the declaration of a particular action to be criminal is just. The perfect example of this is the punishment for adultery, which requires four witnesses that actually see the act of penetration. Unfortunately, some so-called Islamic republics or states today implement the Hadd substantively, but fail to properly understand the procedural requirements. Mufti Taqi Usmani wrote an extensive article explaining this distinction in an article where he dealt with a lot of misunderstandings that people had with the Hudood Ordinances in Pakistan. In reality, one must look at the totality of the circumstances. A Qadhi scrutinizes the reliability of each witness, whether they were trustworthy, whether they had the proper faculties to observe the crime, whether their testimony was internally consistent, etc. Furthermore, the Qadhi looks at whether the testimony of each witness was consistent with the testimony of the other witensses, whether their was any collusion, whether it was consistent with the testimony of the accused, whether it was consistent with the forensic and physical evidence, etc. Thus, the punishment of the crime in principle may is just, but the way that the crime is punished may not be.
In addition to substantive and procedural justice, there is personal justice which is treatment of members of society in a just manner. This goes in the topic of adab, akhlaq, and mu'amalat. One must treat one's neighbors, family, elders, woman, children, indigent, sick, orphans, in a just manner by fulfilling their rights. These rights are defined by Allah (subhana wa ta'ala) and the Prophet (sallahu alayhi wa sallam).
These are the basic forms of the Islamic conceptions of justice.
For reasons I hope are clear by now, what is concerning, to me, throughout all this is the positivist understanding of the law and justice (and hence revelation as whole) which in fact denigrates the very nature of being human and as such undermines creation.
I think the first thing to note, again questioning the strong division you wish to create between Islam and the West, is that there are plenty of western thinkers who take revelation to be normative (Karl Barth most prominently from the 20th century), and of course there are traditions of legal positivism within the western tradition as well: Carl Schmitt most prominently in the 20th century, and Schmitt is making a come back in a new form in figures like Chantal Mouffe; not coincidentally Schmitt's own legal positivism is theologically based, influenced by the understanding of God and revelation introduced at the 1st Vatican Council (a council which picked its own fight with so-called "secularism"); Schmitt is also the father of contemporary western political theology as well being chief jurist for the Weimar Republic and early in the Third Reich.
Also, continuing to question the strong division between Islam and so-called western thought, you point out that my thought is influenced by Platonism and this is of course true, though in an historicized form: participation (methexis) in the divine is mediated historically. But to say I have Platonic influences again does not constitute a serious breach, in itself, with Islam. It is my appreciation of the Neoplatonic tradition that makes al-Farabi appealing, ibn'Arabi, ibn'Sina; and then of course there is ibn'Rushd who is rolling over in his grave at every word that you write.
I have not, in all this, been trying to argue that there were no differences between various traditions of philosophy and theology in the west and in Islam, merely pointing out that the gap was hardly as deep as you would like it to be. In certain areas there is even convergence. Nor have I ever meant to imply that convergence in things like legal positivism means that Islam was copying European thinkers; instead I am merely pointing out that the understanding of the law that you are articulating is not uniquely Islamic (and for that matter is not the only understanding of the law within Islam). And yes of course it is my idealism or Neoplatonism, as you note elsewhere, that makes me cringe every time you take a positivist line.
you say: "Things are good because God says they are good and things are bad because God says they are bad."This is precisely why I argued elsewhere that you break the link between humanity and God and make God into a tyrant. According to this position we obey God for no other reason than God threatens to overwhelm us in its power. But, thankfully, your positivism is not consistent and you drift back towards a meaningful account of justice yourself.
you say: "laws from the creator are not in and of themselves independently just, but are just because the Creator Himself commanded it and since He is infinitely just, His pronouncements, commands, and prohibitions, are all just as well."Here you once again begin by asserting the merely positive nature of the law. It is given and must be accepted for no other reason than its sheer givenness. But in the second half you affirm that God is itself Justice and so that which proceeds from God shares in that justice. Now I suppose you could reply that this is meaningless and incomprehensible jabber and you simply use the term justice because it is a revealed name. But in order for it to be a truly meaningful claim there has to be some connection between our desire for Justice and our desire for God. In this case we recognize the law as just because it contributes to the fulfillment of the desire for the Infinite (which is the desire for God-Justice). In this case the "rationalization" of the law is not a secondary operation following upon its positivity, and indeed the law cannot be just without its capacity for rationalization. The law is just only to the extent it is intelligible. And on the flip side of this, if the law responds to human desire for justice, or satisfies the rational demands for justice then it is in accordance with the human pursuit of the divine.
And finally, because I have been controlling the shape of this conversation, I end with a brief statement from JM that came in response, and summarized his view…
With regards to the assertion that Islamic law is essentially a legal positivist tradition, I would pretty much agree with that. However, if it advocates legal positivism, it isn't because Western civilization advocated this view, it is an independent conclusion. Again, I have no problem with studying Western philosophy with the recognition that Islamic philosophy is a distinct way of thinking that has its own concerns and deals with certain problems by its own distinct methodologies. While there are similarities, they are still two different paradigms.
-LoA
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
The Feast of St. Pachomius of Egypt (15 May)
Founder of Communal Monasticism in Christianity. His rule for the monks stands as one of the early examples of Coptic literature. He organized communities for both men and women and legend says that there were some 3000 monks in those communities at the time of his death in 348.
Abba Pakhom
Troparion for Pachomius the Great (Tone VII)
With the streams of thy tears thou didst irrigate the barren desert,
and with sighs from the depths of thy soul thou didst render thy labors fruitful an hundredfold.
Thou wast a beacon for the whole world, radiating miracles.
O our father Pachomius, entreat Christ God that our souls be saved.
Abba Pakhom
Troparion for Pachomius the Great (Tone VII)
With the streams of thy tears thou didst irrigate the barren desert,
and with sighs from the depths of thy soul thou didst render thy labors fruitful an hundredfold.
Thou wast a beacon for the whole world, radiating miracles.
O our father Pachomius, entreat Christ God that our souls be saved.
Thursday, May 8, 2008
Clareno/Mishev
Boyan Ivanov Mishev, "The Celebration of Orpheus" (2006)
"Remember that the Redeemer's mercy wipes our sins away, not in one way alone, but in many ways."
Angelo Clareno, "Letter to Phillip of Majorca" (c.1324)
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Ebner/Kassan
David Jon Kassan, "Approach" (2006)
I said, "Lord, if you allow me to do something wrong here, then you must do penance for me."
God answered me, "You should come to me because I will never leave you, neither here nor hereafter. Whoever desires me in true love, I will never renounce in true love."
Margaret Ebner, Revelations (1348)
Thursday, April 10, 2008
christian carnival
The 219th Christian Carnival is posted at Chasing the Wind. This includes my brief reflections on Wright and Obama.
I would also point out the reflections on Wright and Obama that took place over at Catholic Anarchy.
-LoA
I would also point out the reflections on Wright and Obama that took place over at Catholic Anarchy.
-LoA
Saturday, March 29, 2008
wright speaks the truth; obama apologizes for it
Christianity did not arise as a national or a class religion. As a dominant religion of rulers it must deny its origin in the crucified Christ and lose its identity. The crucified God is in fact a stateless and classless God. But it does not mean an unpolitical God. God is the God of the poor, the oppressed and the humiliated. The rule of the Christ who was crucified for political reasons can only be extended through liberation from forms of rule which make humanity servile and apathetic and the political religions which give them stability [i can't help but be reminded here of shariati's religion against religion. -LoA]. According to Paul, the perfection of the kingdom of freedom is to bring about the annihilation of all rule, authority and power, which are still unavoidable here, and at the same time to achieve the overcoming of apathy and alienation. Christians will seek to anticipate the future of Christ according to the measure of the possibilities available to them, by breaking down lordship and building up the political liveliness of each person.
Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (1972)
Jon deMartin, "Faith in the Wilderness" (2006)
i have to admit that to me, a white man from rural north carolina, the words of rev. wright were beautiful. they brought back memories of many of the sermons i heard as a child and young adult, often, or even especially around the 4th of july or an election. the theme that was often pounded home from the pulpit of my home church was "heal our land". the clear implication, often made quite explicit, was that the country was sick and subject to divine judgment.
so my question has been from the beginning, what did rev. wright say that was wrong?
on this good friday, one should remember that jesus was executed as a political threat and blasphemer. he was not sentenced and killed for being nice and loving everyone. mr. rogers and barney the dinosaur are disgustingly sweet; no one suggested they be tried for treason. so the idea that sunday morning sermons should be inoffensive and make everybody feel better about themselves seems obviously absurd...even if for the most part this absurdity has become the reality in many churches. the words of pastor wright, the 30 seconds of sermon that we get to hear online, are apparently too much for fragile american ears, even though they are some of the most christian statements i have heard in a long time. they are the words of a christianity which refuses to be shackled to a state, refuses to be the handmaid of an alien power, refuses to lie in order to placate the powers and thrones that rule the american nation. america is not the kingdom of god and has been all too often blind to its own history of injustice and murder. the fact that rev. wright's words were so controversial -- pointing out the racism that still functions so powerfully in american life; reminding americans, as we try to limit nuclear weapons, that we alone have used them; reminding americans, as we fight against terrorism, that we have waged and are waging war with little concern for the lives of others; that america is not god -- is simply more evidence that america has made an idol of itself and that the nation has supplanted god in the minds and hearts of the american people.
obama has distanced himself from the "inflammatory" words of pastor wright. there are pragmatic reasons for this. perhaps it is the case that a christian cannot say the truth and be elected president. but the fact that obama denounced the truth reveals that he is nothing new on the political scene, and the fact that america needed him to denounce the words of his pastor in order to have a chance of being president suggests that america wants many things, but it does not want change. america does not wish to hear of its illness, but wants a president that will continue to lead it -- with the imperial band playing its march -- triumphantly into the glorious future that belongs to it by right, by nature. because america is the greatest nation in the world.
and it proves once again that prophets are not welcome in their own country.
-LoA
Evan Wilson, "Down to the Water" (2006)
"Woe to you who are rich, for you have received your consolation.
Woe to you who are full, for you will be hungry.
Woe to you who are laughing, for you will mourn and weep.
...
Why do you see the speck in your neighbor's eye, but do not notice the log in your own eye? Or how can you say to your neighbor, 'Brother, let me take the speck out of your eye', when you yourself do not see the log in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor's eye."
Luke 6:24-25,41-42 (c.75 AD)
Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (1972)
Jon deMartin, "Faith in the Wilderness" (2006)
i have to admit that to me, a white man from rural north carolina, the words of rev. wright were beautiful. they brought back memories of many of the sermons i heard as a child and young adult, often, or even especially around the 4th of july or an election. the theme that was often pounded home from the pulpit of my home church was "heal our land". the clear implication, often made quite explicit, was that the country was sick and subject to divine judgment.
so my question has been from the beginning, what did rev. wright say that was wrong?
on this good friday, one should remember that jesus was executed as a political threat and blasphemer. he was not sentenced and killed for being nice and loving everyone. mr. rogers and barney the dinosaur are disgustingly sweet; no one suggested they be tried for treason. so the idea that sunday morning sermons should be inoffensive and make everybody feel better about themselves seems obviously absurd...even if for the most part this absurdity has become the reality in many churches. the words of pastor wright, the 30 seconds of sermon that we get to hear online, are apparently too much for fragile american ears, even though they are some of the most christian statements i have heard in a long time. they are the words of a christianity which refuses to be shackled to a state, refuses to be the handmaid of an alien power, refuses to lie in order to placate the powers and thrones that rule the american nation. america is not the kingdom of god and has been all too often blind to its own history of injustice and murder. the fact that rev. wright's words were so controversial -- pointing out the racism that still functions so powerfully in american life; reminding americans, as we try to limit nuclear weapons, that we alone have used them; reminding americans, as we fight against terrorism, that we have waged and are waging war with little concern for the lives of others; that america is not god -- is simply more evidence that america has made an idol of itself and that the nation has supplanted god in the minds and hearts of the american people.
obama has distanced himself from the "inflammatory" words of pastor wright. there are pragmatic reasons for this. perhaps it is the case that a christian cannot say the truth and be elected president. but the fact that obama denounced the truth reveals that he is nothing new on the political scene, and the fact that america needed him to denounce the words of his pastor in order to have a chance of being president suggests that america wants many things, but it does not want change. america does not wish to hear of its illness, but wants a president that will continue to lead it -- with the imperial band playing its march -- triumphantly into the glorious future that belongs to it by right, by nature. because america is the greatest nation in the world.
and it proves once again that prophets are not welcome in their own country.
-LoA
Evan Wilson, "Down to the Water" (2006)
"Woe to you who are rich, for you have received your consolation.
Woe to you who are full, for you will be hungry.
Woe to you who are laughing, for you will mourn and weep.
...
Why do you see the speck in your neighbor's eye, but do not notice the log in your own eye? Or how can you say to your neighbor, 'Brother, let me take the speck out of your eye', when you yourself do not see the log in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your neighbor's eye."
Luke 6:24-25,41-42 (c.75 AD)
Sunday, March 23, 2008
you are what you read
You're The Guns of August!
by Barbara Tuchman
Though you're interested in war, what you really want to know is what
causes war. You're out to expose imperialism, militarism, and nationalism for what they
really are. Nevertheless, you're always living in the past and have a hard time dealing
with what's going on today. You're also far more focused on Europe than anywhere else in
the world. A fitting motto for you might be "Guns do kill, but diplomats are usually pulling the trigger."
Take the Book Quiz
at the Blue Pyramid.
snagged from ayesha
Thursday, February 21, 2008
height (concerning vertigo)
Christopher Cousins, "Unadherence" (2007)
beyond vertigo, faith is to find oneself in the grip of height and without ground. this can be confused with vertigo since, in the disorientation and fear that inevitably follows, one feels as if one might plunge into the abyss. yet vertigo is a desperate attempt to cling to self-control when in the grip of height, fearing that one may step off the edge, might lose one's footing. but beyond fear, peace will be the recognition that one was never simply one's own, and has not been plunged into the abyss. there can be, in the grip of pure height, no fall, because the height has no limit: one is actually in perfect rest. recognizing that one is at a height beyond all abyss is the constant challenge of faith. this is why there is despair even in faith: one wonders if one is not truly falling, and if one will ever truly learn to rest.
-LoA
Sunday, February 10, 2008
Recalling 12 September 1960
The day on which American Catholics decided they wanted to be Protestants after all.
It was the day on which JFK insisted that the separation of Church and State was not merely a legal principle found in the United States constitution, but that somehow he had so thoroughly internalized it that it had become etched on his soul and that Catholicism would have no political bearing on his life.
John Courtney Murray would provide the theoretical description and pushed for the Protestantization of Catholicism all the way to the Second Vatican Council.
And may God have mercy on our souls.
It was the day on which JFK insisted that the separation of Church and State was not merely a legal principle found in the United States constitution, but that somehow he had so thoroughly internalized it that it had become etched on his soul and that Catholicism would have no political bearing on his life.
John Courtney Murray would provide the theoretical description and pushed for the Protestantization of Catholicism all the way to the Second Vatican Council.
And may God have mercy on our souls.
Recalling 1829
In 1829 the Catholic Emancipation Act was passed in the United Kingdom. In the minds of many at the time it was unconstitutional insofar as the sovereign was both the spiritual and political head of the people and as such there was no way in which Catholic's could submit fully to the crown. On the other hand, it seems more appropriate to see it as a broadening of the crown's power and a liberalization of the understanding of it's role. No longer would it be the case that English civil religion would be equated with one particular cultic form but instead the way was opened to embrace ever wider forms of cultic practice under the spiritual direction of the crown and thereby sublimate them to Englishness. In this way the law and rule of England came to be more uniformly and systematically applied to its citizens, eliminating a situation in which Catholic's existed at a lower or marginal level within the English state.
The existence of parallel courts of law at the peripheries of the English legal system is a return to the days prior to 1829 when it was recognized that there were those citizens and permanent residents of the nation who could never really be English and who did not reside within the fullness of English law. Rowan Williams, who currently has his plate full presiding over the dissolution of the Church of England, may well be presiding over the dissolution of 1829 and the liberal English state as well.
-LoA
The existence of parallel courts of law at the peripheries of the English legal system is a return to the days prior to 1829 when it was recognized that there were those citizens and permanent residents of the nation who could never really be English and who did not reside within the fullness of English law. Rowan Williams, who currently has his plate full presiding over the dissolution of the Church of England, may well be presiding over the dissolution of 1829 and the liberal English state as well.
-LoA
Friday, February 8, 2008
When Liberalism Loses the Courage of Its Convictions
This week the chief prelate of the Church of England, the widely respected Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, suggested that England find a way to accommodate the traditional forms of Shariah law, especially with respect to family disputes, within the legal structures of the United Kingdom. Williams is a scholar and academic with outstanding works on topics ranging widely from the Arian controversy of the 4th c. AD to the work of the Russian Orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov. This is hardly likely to be a spontaneous or thoughtless comment; instead it is likely to be the studied opinion of the most vocal and important spokesperson of the English government on matters of religion and faith.
In recent days I have been preparing to teach a course on world religions. It is not a task I relish since the whole discipline of world religions is a minefield of Orientalism. As a theologian, I am struck by the lack of systematic thought that has gone into the idea of dialogue with those who exist extra ecclesiam. It has sparked in me a hint of admiration for Political Liberalism insofar as it has one of the most well conceived, systematic and coherent "theologies" of religion in the West. Insisting on the private and moral nature of religion, Political Liberalism has managed to sublimate the great traditions that preceded it under its banner. Its post-Christian Protestantism insistence on the separation of faith and works allows it to leave the beliefs of the traditions "intact" while nonetheless bringing the practice of all into accordance with its vision of who humans are and the nature of a stable human community. The Secular is not so much an a-religious space, but a transreligious one with new rituals and liturgical forms that organize and interpret - and ultimately relativize - the place of other traditions in the life of its citizens.
The allowance of parallel legal institutions with the UK strikes at one of the central tenets of Politically Liberal "theology" of religions: the separation of faith and works. As a Roman Catholic the separation was never particularly appealing and it has always fascinated me the extent to which Catholics have failed to fight against it in their desire to enter into the mainstream of Liberal cultural and political life (JFK for instance had to embrace it in order to legitimize his candidacy). Nonetheless, when Liberalism begins to question the foundations of its own existence one has to wonder whether or not Liberalism has lost its faith. Is the Liberal experiment failed?
And what next from the Archbishop of Canterbury? It has been suggested that the creation of parallel religious courts will help Catholicism in such matters as adoption. Many adoption agencies in the US and the UK have run into problems as they are required, under existing law, to allow same-sex couples to adopt children (in the state of Massachusetts for instance, Catholic charities no longer arranges adoptions). But what else will be covered. Will divorces be denied to Catholic couples? What criminal charges will a husband be allowed to bring against his wife if he finds out she is using birth control? If he finds out she had an abortion - i.e., in the eyes of the Church, committed murder?
Where is Liberalism going?
In recent days I have been preparing to teach a course on world religions. It is not a task I relish since the whole discipline of world religions is a minefield of Orientalism. As a theologian, I am struck by the lack of systematic thought that has gone into the idea of dialogue with those who exist extra ecclesiam. It has sparked in me a hint of admiration for Political Liberalism insofar as it has one of the most well conceived, systematic and coherent "theologies" of religion in the West. Insisting on the private and moral nature of religion, Political Liberalism has managed to sublimate the great traditions that preceded it under its banner. Its post-Christian Protestantism insistence on the separation of faith and works allows it to leave the beliefs of the traditions "intact" while nonetheless bringing the practice of all into accordance with its vision of who humans are and the nature of a stable human community. The Secular is not so much an a-religious space, but a transreligious one with new rituals and liturgical forms that organize and interpret - and ultimately relativize - the place of other traditions in the life of its citizens.
The allowance of parallel legal institutions with the UK strikes at one of the central tenets of Politically Liberal "theology" of religions: the separation of faith and works. As a Roman Catholic the separation was never particularly appealing and it has always fascinated me the extent to which Catholics have failed to fight against it in their desire to enter into the mainstream of Liberal cultural and political life (JFK for instance had to embrace it in order to legitimize his candidacy). Nonetheless, when Liberalism begins to question the foundations of its own existence one has to wonder whether or not Liberalism has lost its faith. Is the Liberal experiment failed?
And what next from the Archbishop of Canterbury? It has been suggested that the creation of parallel religious courts will help Catholicism in such matters as adoption. Many adoption agencies in the US and the UK have run into problems as they are required, under existing law, to allow same-sex couples to adopt children (in the state of Massachusetts for instance, Catholic charities no longer arranges adoptions). But what else will be covered. Will divorces be denied to Catholic couples? What criminal charges will a husband be allowed to bring against his wife if he finds out she is using birth control? If he finds out she had an abortion - i.e., in the eyes of the Church, committed murder?
Where is Liberalism going?
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
Reason #67 We Don't Have Children
We can't even make our cat behave!
We haven't been able to keep her off the kitchen counters lately and last night she jumped up on them right in front of us!!
We haven't been able to keep her off the kitchen counters lately and last night she jumped up on them right in front of us!!
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
eurydice to orpheus
Edmund Dulac, "Orpheus and Eurydice" (c.1934) [Watercolor & Gouache on Paper]
notes in the margins of a book i am still writing, that is not yet finished, sing to me what i am feeling; aphoristic melodies of thoughts i discover i am having before i can write them down.
and you are the author and instrument, some sort of guide across the styx behind which i have hidden. cerebus is charmed, my mind-ever-vicious, tamed; i am opened and you go into the dark and heavy what i am.
(even as a child all i wanted to do was to paint the page black, complete and entire. so i went here, to a place where finality could be attained, to a place where i would not have to hear any voice (your voice so wonderful), where i could establish the safety of a world, and leave no other space on the page for anything else.)
too light to be restrained by the inscription of laws that forbid the song C leading me outward, page by page, around the margins of the body of the text so that i am no longer trapped where i had fled and set up guards, in myself, in the interminable internality of being me C you chant and enchant me.
proclamation of resurrection
proclamation that there must be a nothingness, an other death, than the one i write: a willingness to die (like you undertook in coming to me). to cross, to step past the end of the line, to look for meaning prior to the first word, after the last period, in the space you have opened around me.
overwhelming space, refusing to let me write a life that goes to the edge of the page, that is all encompassing; leaving me to either founder in my attempts to script out the sound and to assert only eurydice C or, to admit (an olympian admission, to truly hear the song in hades) that the best of me lies with you, in the music that impinges on the margins of the page.
-LoA
Thursday, January 10, 2008
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
Al Faisal University, Riyadh KSA
LoA: Honey, Look! They are opening a brand new University in Riyadh.
She: I will divorce you. *serious stare*
LoA: Shall I make chicken for dinner?
*She goes back to what she was doing*
She: I will divorce you. *serious stare*
LoA: Shall I make chicken for dinner?
*She goes back to what she was doing*
ALFAISAL UNIVERSITY is a private, not-for-profit research university that will be self-governing and internationally recognized in education and research, and that will produce capable trained professionals who lead their fields. Students will begin their programs in Colleges of Business, Engineering, Medicine, and Science and General Studies in Fall 2008. Eventually, the University will enroll 1,000 students per class. The initial class will be much smaller with a gradual build up thereafter. The campus is being constructed on the beautiful grounds of the late King Faisal’s Palace in Al Maather in the center of Riyadh. The Palace will serve as the administration quarters; the other buildings will form an almost complete circle around it. Instruction will be in English. The University was founded by the King Faisal Foundation and organizations such as Boeing, British Aerospace, THALES, and King Faisal Specialist Hospital & Research Center, whose representatives serve on the Board of Trustees. Before entering the University, students will complete a rigorous one-year preparatory program that emphasizes English language, study skills, math and science. The College of Science and General Studies offers a four-year degree program in genetics and life sciences. In addition, the College provides core courses in the sciences, humanities, and social sciences for all university students. The curriculum of the College will involve problem-based and technologically-enhanced learning. Graduate programs will be added in the near future. The goal of these programs is to train students to use systems- and critical thinking, problem solving, and teamwork. Our programs are designed to meet high international standards with collaboration from major western research universities. The College of Science and General Studies seeks faculty with teaching and research expertise in English Literature and Language; Philosophy and Ethics; Arabic Literature and Language; and Islamic Studies. Attractive salaries and generous benefits will be provided. Queries and applications should be sent to humanitiesrecruitment@alfaisal.edu and should include a cv and the names of three references. The subject line should specify the discipline, position and advertisement reference. The deadline for applications is 15 January 2008. Off-site interviews for leading candidates will be conducted in early 2008 in the US, Europe and/or the Middle East.
Tuesday, January 8, 2008
are you my mother?
Adrienne Stein, "I Looked for the One my Heart Loves" (2006)
Many of you, no doubt, know and grew up on the childhood story of the duckling that went around searching for its mother. It introduced children to various animals, and likewise provided children with a sense that was a place they belonged, some place that could properly be called home.
Heidegger argued in Being and Time that we needed to find that spot, that home, embrace it and make it ours in order live genuinely human lives. This home, according to Heidegger, was not something chosen arbitrarily; it was more something into which we were thrust by history and which we needed to accept. In effect, Heidegger is describing the idea of Tradition. That there is a cultural and historical conversation into which one is thrust, that one cannot opt out of, and with which one must wrestle.
To be American especially, and really one can say more generally to be a member of liberal society, is to be part of a tradition of forgetting for Heidegger. Systemic forgetting. The destruction of tradition. In fact the destruction of tradition has become the great liberal tradition. We are watching that tradition wage a crusade in its name in our own time. This is the tradition of which we are a part.
Having destroyed the traditions of our ancestors, or at least systematically forgotten our own origins and history, we struggle under the need for some sort of positive tradition to bind us together. Having wiped out the liturgical calendar, we institute a new one: Halloween, Thanksgiving, Christmas, New Years, Valentine's Day, etc. replaces the rhythms of a lost liturgical calendar which contained periods of feasts and fasting; penance, reconciliation and joy.
And what if one feels the weight of this loss, the loss of tradition? What is one to do? Can one choose a tradition? Having been catechized into the tradition of traditionlessness, can one enter into a new conversation that remains self-consciously historical? Is conversion possible?
I chose Catholicism. It was not my tradition. My tradition was...Pietist, Enthusiastic, Holiness, Pentecostal...the convergence of various Wesleyan strains into the historically naive Christianity that suits America so very well. But how does one convert. The awakening to history that meant the break with Pietism in its various forms does not mean that one now is part of some other history. It simply means that one is self-conscious of the historical contradiction within which one finds oneself.
One awakens to history and like the lost duck one turns to that which is near, to that closest body which seems in some form or another to have preserved historical consciousness of its own being, and asks "Are you my mother?"
-LoA
Sunday, January 6, 2008
pour it early and often?
just one of the amusing sights downeast...
LoA, "What Drinking Problem? (Marshallberg, NC)" (4 January 2008)
oddly, it appears to have gone out of business.
LoA, "What Drinking Problem? (Marshallberg, NC)" (4 January 2008)
oddly, it appears to have gone out of business.
Friday, January 4, 2008
hafiz/eichenberg
Fritz Eichenberg, "The Long Loneliness" (1952)
We have not come here to take prisoners,
But to surrender ever more deeply
To freedom and joy.
-Hafiz (14th. century)
Tuesday, January 1, 2008
Happy New Ye......WTF?!?
Another story for another post, and with any luck that will follow, but I was in Oriental, NC last night for New Years. This involves taking the Minnesott Beach ferry across the Neuse River. While we were waiting for the return ferry I went into the rest station where, in both the men's and women's restrooms, one could find the following....
LoA, "Minnesott Beach Ferry, Men's Restroom #1" (31 December 2007)
The sign only appeared in Spanish...
LoA, "Minnesott Beach Ferry, Men's Restroom #2" (31 Dec 2007)
leading one to one of two conclusions. First, English speakers weren't welcome in this bathroom. Prima Facie, unlikely. Second, it was meant to be insulting to Spanish speakers, who apparently needed to be told how to use toilet paper, when English speakers don't.
In any case one cannot help but be surprised to find, in a very conservative area of the state of NC, an area where one would not be surpised to hear someone express English-only sentiments, an area with a history of racism, using Spanish only signs...unless it too is an expression of racism. That it is found in the State Ferry Station is insulting to all of us who call NC home.
LoA, "Minnesott Beach Ferry House" (31 Dec 2007)
-LoA
LoA, "Minnesott Beach Ferry, Men's Restroom #1" (31 December 2007)
The sign only appeared in Spanish...
LoA, "Minnesott Beach Ferry, Men's Restroom #2" (31 Dec 2007)
leading one to one of two conclusions. First, English speakers weren't welcome in this bathroom. Prima Facie, unlikely. Second, it was meant to be insulting to Spanish speakers, who apparently needed to be told how to use toilet paper, when English speakers don't.
In any case one cannot help but be surprised to find, in a very conservative area of the state of NC, an area where one would not be surpised to hear someone express English-only sentiments, an area with a history of racism, using Spanish only signs...unless it too is an expression of racism. That it is found in the State Ferry Station is insulting to all of us who call NC home.
LoA, "Minnesott Beach Ferry House" (31 Dec 2007)
-LoA
Friday, December 28, 2007
Pointing: Benazir Bhutto
Bhutto was a glimmer of the Future.
Benazir Bhutto, 1953-2007
I am not even sure what draft this is of this post. I have lost track. I have proved unable today to say who Benazir Bhutto was to me and more importantly why.
She called me this morning at 8am. Until Tuesday night She had not even known who Bhutto was. Christmas night we went to see Charlie Wilson's War. In the conversation that followed over a traditional Christmas sushi dinner the Bhutto family came up and I tried to explain the reference in the movie to the show-trial murder of Benazir's father. We went on to talk about the importance of the Bhutto family and as we moved into a discussion of contemporary politics, I tried to explain the significance and importance of Benazir Bhutto.
I admit I was not adequate to the task. I was just finishing high school when she became PM for the first time. I was much more political then than I am now and I recall being struck by her. Maybe I had a crush on her. Whatever the case, I was amazed by her. Her rise to power and her courage. The fact that she seemed unflinching in the face of constant anger and hatred that was directed at her and her family. I was struck by her election to the office of PM and the harsh light that event shined upon the reality of women in American politics at the time [recall the absolute slaughter of Mondale with Ferraro on his ticket, for instance]. In that sense Bhutto was one of the forces that led me, let's be honest here, slowly, towards feminism.
I tried to compare her to the other great female politicians of the 20th century: Thatcher, Meir, Ghandi. I noted on Tuesday night that her decision to return to Pakistan this year almost certainly meant that her fate and Indira Ghandi's would ultimately be the same - that she would in all likelihood join her father and brothers - that she had somehow, self-consciously and with courage chosen a path that would end with her murder. I had no idea that two days later...
As I said, She called me at 8am this morning. I went downstairs and for reasons I cannot fully explain cried. And cried. The gora with no ties of blood to Pakistan, the Christian who had never lived there, raised in the south eastern United States, cried. Until I was exhausted. Possibilities had disappeared from the world because - and this is the best I can manage, I am sorry to say - Bhutto was Possibility.
She was the ability to see the future beyond the horizon of life and death that seems to engulf everything.
I am no longer deeply political. Or the nature of my politics has radically changed. However one wants to say it, it was no longer Bhutto's politics that made her compelling to me. What made her compelling was her ability to return to Pakistan in October. Her ability to face forces that were beyond her capacity to contain, beyond the ability of a single will to master and bend, and to stand against those forces and point to the Future that those forces sought to deny. That they denied again today. Bhutto affirmed the possibility of a Future that was itself not bound by or to the forces that sought to deny it. Bhutto pointed!
To Allah we belong and to Allah we return.
Benazir Bhutto, 1953-2007
I am not even sure what draft this is of this post. I have lost track. I have proved unable today to say who Benazir Bhutto was to me and more importantly why.
She called me this morning at 8am. Until Tuesday night She had not even known who Bhutto was. Christmas night we went to see Charlie Wilson's War. In the conversation that followed over a traditional Christmas sushi dinner the Bhutto family came up and I tried to explain the reference in the movie to the show-trial murder of Benazir's father. We went on to talk about the importance of the Bhutto family and as we moved into a discussion of contemporary politics, I tried to explain the significance and importance of Benazir Bhutto.
I admit I was not adequate to the task. I was just finishing high school when she became PM for the first time. I was much more political then than I am now and I recall being struck by her. Maybe I had a crush on her. Whatever the case, I was amazed by her. Her rise to power and her courage. The fact that she seemed unflinching in the face of constant anger and hatred that was directed at her and her family. I was struck by her election to the office of PM and the harsh light that event shined upon the reality of women in American politics at the time [recall the absolute slaughter of Mondale with Ferraro on his ticket, for instance]. In that sense Bhutto was one of the forces that led me, let's be honest here, slowly, towards feminism.
I tried to compare her to the other great female politicians of the 20th century: Thatcher, Meir, Ghandi. I noted on Tuesday night that her decision to return to Pakistan this year almost certainly meant that her fate and Indira Ghandi's would ultimately be the same - that she would in all likelihood join her father and brothers - that she had somehow, self-consciously and with courage chosen a path that would end with her murder. I had no idea that two days later...
As I said, She called me at 8am this morning. I went downstairs and for reasons I cannot fully explain cried. And cried. The gora with no ties of blood to Pakistan, the Christian who had never lived there, raised in the south eastern United States, cried. Until I was exhausted. Possibilities had disappeared from the world because - and this is the best I can manage, I am sorry to say - Bhutto was Possibility.
She was the ability to see the future beyond the horizon of life and death that seems to engulf everything.
I am no longer deeply political. Or the nature of my politics has radically changed. However one wants to say it, it was no longer Bhutto's politics that made her compelling to me. What made her compelling was her ability to return to Pakistan in October. Her ability to face forces that were beyond her capacity to contain, beyond the ability of a single will to master and bend, and to stand against those forces and point to the Future that those forces sought to deny. That they denied again today. Bhutto affirmed the possibility of a Future that was itself not bound by or to the forces that sought to deny it. Bhutto pointed!
To Allah we belong and to Allah we return.
Monday, December 24, 2007
birth: five propositions for meister eckhart on christmas (the struggle, part 8)
Arthur Hughes, "The Nativity" (1858)
mary gave birth to Truth so that the Truth might be made universally incarnate in us.
until the event of Truth is universally incarnate as History, nothing is Whole (adorno: "the whole is the false").
Truth must be realized in order to be Whole, therefore we must give birth to Truth.
mary is the last moment before the initial realization of Truth. mary realized that she was nothing and thus she was set free to be the event of the birth of Truth: the one whose heart had the fecundity of virginity and the purity of motherhood. but beyond mary's insight, one must realize that the consummation of the nothing is Truth and that the Truth is not-other to the nothing. this is incarnation.
today, we too fail to grasp the possibility of the Whole-of-History (Peace). but perhaps like mary we can realize that we are nothing ("let it be done to me as you will") and thus be the site in which Truth is born. therefore let us be the nothing out of which the Truth creates History.
-LoA
Monday, December 3, 2007
let them eat pie: appendix (for ayesha, et al.)
since the pecan pie discussion was so popular, and since someone said cheesecake, i offer this little variant on the pecan pie that we tried this thanksgiving with great success (or, at least i liked it). all the halal issues of vanilla extract would have to be dealt with in this recipe as well. enjoy. (nov 2007, southern living -- god, i love that magazine)
ingredients:
a refrigerated pie crust
1 8oz. package of cream cheese (softened)
4 large eggs
3/4 cup of sugar
2 tsp vanilla extract
1/4 tsp of salt
1.25 cups chopped pecans
[yes, thats right, i went from fractions to decimals, because thats just how i roll]
1 cup light corn syrup
--------------
directions:
1. fit pie crust into a 9-in pie plate....fold edges under and crimp
2. beat cream cheese, 1 egg, 1/2 cup sugar, 1 tsp vanilla and salt at medium speed with an electric mixer until smooth. pour cream cheese mixture into piecrust; sprinkle evenly with chopped pecans.
3. whisk together corn syrup and remaining 3 eggs, 1/4 cup sugar and 1 tsp vanilla; pour mixture over the pecans and place pie on a baking sheet.
4. bake at 350F on the lowest rack of the oven for 50-55 mins or until pie is set. cool on a wire rack 1hr or until cool. serve immediately or cover and chill up to 2 days (yea, like a pie is gonna sit around for that long with no one eating it).
ingredients:
a refrigerated pie crust
1 8oz. package of cream cheese (softened)
4 large eggs
3/4 cup of sugar
2 tsp vanilla extract
1/4 tsp of salt
1.25 cups chopped pecans
[yes, thats right, i went from fractions to decimals, because thats just how i roll]
1 cup light corn syrup
--------------
directions:
1. fit pie crust into a 9-in pie plate....fold edges under and crimp
2. beat cream cheese, 1 egg, 1/2 cup sugar, 1 tsp vanilla and salt at medium speed with an electric mixer until smooth. pour cream cheese mixture into piecrust; sprinkle evenly with chopped pecans.
3. whisk together corn syrup and remaining 3 eggs, 1/4 cup sugar and 1 tsp vanilla; pour mixture over the pecans and place pie on a baking sheet.
4. bake at 350F on the lowest rack of the oven for 50-55 mins or until pie is set. cool on a wire rack 1hr or until cool. serve immediately or cover and chill up to 2 days (yea, like a pie is gonna sit around for that long with no one eating it).
Thursday, November 22, 2007
let them eat pie
Every nation should have a national holiday on which they celebrate the fact that they were welcomed warmly by strangers who nurtured them to health until they were ready to engage in a rather successful 200+ year genocidal campaign against said strangers. You would think it would be day of national mourning maybe?, but if that's what you think you seriously misunderstand how nations work. Nations are little (or in our case not-so-little) bands of we-ness with their guns pointed at everyone else's they-ness. So, your national celebration of successful genocide should be....a celebration. We here in America call ours Thanksgiving. "God are we ever thankful that you gave us the military superiority to clear most of the continent of its indigenous inhabitants."
The food you eat on such a holiday should reflect the national character: therefore the food of choice in our case is Turkey; after all, you are what you eat. I like to follow up my holiday gorging with some fun reading. I highly recommend a happy novel, like Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian, Or the Evening Redness in the West. If more people read this book they would have a better understanding of American foreign policy (we are so misunderstood).
Finally one should not forget dessert. Seriously. I am from the South so therefore my dessert of choice is pecan pie. Sure pumpkin pie is nice too, and I will be making one of those as well, but nothing matches the pure super-caloric consumptive delight that is pecan pie. A slice of heaven. Seriously.
1. Don't make your own pie crusts. Are you insane? Is there anything more depressing and annoying than the frustrating process of trying to roll out your own pie crust. No, no there isn't. Seriously. Buy a refrigerated pie crust. Thank you.
2. 28 caramels....be sure to eat the rest of the bag while you are unwrapping the other 28; there are starving children somewhere (Canada, I think).
3. 1/4 cup butter
4. 1/4 cup water
5. 3/4 cup sugar (now you're talkin')
6. 2 large eggs
7. 1/2 teaspoon vanilla extract
8. 1/4 teaspoon salt (yes, I said salt, don't argue with me)
9. 1 cup chopped pecans
___________________________________________
After you have baked your pie crust and you have set it out to cool, combine the caramels, butter and water in a large saucepan over medium heat. Cook, stirring constantly!, 5 to 7 minutes or until caramels and butter are melted; remove from heat.
Stir together the sugar and next three ingredients. Stir into caramel mixture until thoroughly combined. Stir in the pecans (it is a pecan pie, remember). Pour into the crust.
Bake the pie at 400 degrees Farhenheit for 10 minutes. Reduce heat to 350 and bake 20 more minutes, after you shield the edges of the crust with aluminum foil to keep them from over-browning. Remove pie and let it cool.
And let them eat pie.
-LoA
The food you eat on such a holiday should reflect the national character: therefore the food of choice in our case is Turkey; after all, you are what you eat. I like to follow up my holiday gorging with some fun reading. I highly recommend a happy novel, like Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian, Or the Evening Redness in the West. If more people read this book they would have a better understanding of American foreign policy (we are so misunderstood).
Finally one should not forget dessert. Seriously. I am from the South so therefore my dessert of choice is pecan pie. Sure pumpkin pie is nice too, and I will be making one of those as well, but nothing matches the pure super-caloric consumptive delight that is pecan pie. A slice of heaven. Seriously.
1. Don't make your own pie crusts. Are you insane? Is there anything more depressing and annoying than the frustrating process of trying to roll out your own pie crust. No, no there isn't. Seriously. Buy a refrigerated pie crust. Thank you.
2. 28 caramels....be sure to eat the rest of the bag while you are unwrapping the other 28; there are starving children somewhere (Canada, I think).
3. 1/4 cup butter
4. 1/4 cup water
5. 3/4 cup sugar (now you're talkin')
6. 2 large eggs
7. 1/2 teaspoon vanilla extract
8. 1/4 teaspoon salt (yes, I said salt, don't argue with me)
9. 1 cup chopped pecans
___________________________________________
After you have baked your pie crust and you have set it out to cool, combine the caramels, butter and water in a large saucepan over medium heat. Cook, stirring constantly!, 5 to 7 minutes or until caramels and butter are melted; remove from heat.
Stir together the sugar and next three ingredients. Stir into caramel mixture until thoroughly combined. Stir in the pecans (it is a pecan pie, remember). Pour into the crust.
Bake the pie at 400 degrees Farhenheit for 10 minutes. Reduce heat to 350 and bake 20 more minutes, after you shield the edges of the crust with aluminum foil to keep them from over-browning. Remove pie and let it cool.
And let them eat pie.
-LoA
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
G. Willow Wilson on NPR
As some of you know I was a contributor for several months over at eteraz.org, as that web site was going through some transitions. During that time I had a brief overlap and was a fellow blogger with G. Willow Wilson, a young journalist and writer, and one of the original writers at eteraz. Having lived in Egypt for some time, she has recently returned to the states and has published a graphic novel entitled Cairo.
She was interviewed today by Neal Conan on NPR's "Talk of the Nation". If you missed her, I encourage you to go over to npr.org and check her out, or to check out the graphic novel itself which is on sale at amazon as well as a comic shop near you.
We wish you the best and continued success GWW,
LoA.
She was interviewed today by Neal Conan on NPR's "Talk of the Nation". If you missed her, I encourage you to go over to npr.org and check her out, or to check out the graphic novel itself which is on sale at amazon as well as a comic shop near you.
We wish you the best and continued success GWW,
LoA.
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
Adorno/Han
Raymond Han, "Frieze" (2001)
“A newspaper obituary for a businessman once contained the words: ‘The breadth of his conscience vied with the kindness of his heart.’ The blunder committed by the bereaved in the elevated language reserved for such purposes, the inadvertent admission that the kindhearted deceased had lacked a conscience, expedites the funeral procession by the shortest route to the land of truth….The bourgeois…is tolerant. His love of people as they are stems from his hatred of what they might be.”
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, #3 (1951)
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Adorno/Assael 3
Steve Assael, "At Mother" (c.2006) [Oil on Canvas, Steel]
"One realizes with horror that earlier, opposing one's parents because they represented the world, one was often secretly the mouthpiece, against a bad world, of one even worse. Unpolitical attempts to break out of the bourgeois family usually lead only to deeper entanglement in it, and it sometimes seems as if the fatal germ-cell of society, the family, were at the nurturing germ-cell of uncompromising pursuit of another. With the family there passes away, while the system lasts, not only the most effective agency of the bourgeoisie, but also the resistance which, though repressing the individual, also strengthened and perhaps even produced it. The end of the family paralyses the forces of opposition. The rising collectivist order is a mockery of a classless one: together with the bourgeois, it liquidates the Utopia that once drew sustenance from motherly love."
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia #2 (1951)
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Adorno/Azarmand
Mina Azarmand, "Dark Quiet" (2006)
"Considerations which start from the subject remain false to the same extent that life has become appearance. For since the overwhelming objectivity of historical movement in its present phase consists so far only in the dissolution of the subject, without yet giving rise to a new one, individual experience necessarily bases itself on the old subject, now historically condemned...The subject still feels sure of its autonomy, but the nullity demonstrated to subjects by the concentration camp is already overtaking the form of subjectivity itself."
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, Dedication (1951)
Sunday, September 30, 2007
Adorno/Freymuth-Frazier
Rose Freymuth-Frazier, "Grand Old Party" (2007)
He who wishes to know about life in its immediacy must scrutinize its estranged form: the objective powers that determine individual existence, even in its most hidden recesses.
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, Preface (1951)
Friday, August 31, 2007
Adorno/Assael 2
Steven Assael, "Skye and Marney" (2001)
"If love in society is to represent a better one, it cannot do so as a peaceful enclave, but only by conscious opposition. This, however, demands precisely the element of voluntariness that the bourgeois, for whom love can never be natural enough, forbid it. Loving mean not letting immediacy wither under the omnipresent weight of mediation and economics, and in such fidelity it becomes itself mediated, as a stubborn counterpressure. He alone loves who has the strength to hold fast to love. Even though social advantage, sublimated, preforms the sexual impulse, using a thousand nuances sanctioned by the order to make now this, now that person seem seriously attractive, an attachment once formed opposes this by persisting where the force of social pressure, in advance of all the intrigues the latter then takes into its service, does not want it....The love, however, which in the guise of unreflecting spontaneity and proud of its alleged integrity, relies exclusively on what it takes to be the voice of the heart, and runs away as soon as it thinks it can no longer hear that voice, is in this supreme independence precisely the tool of society."
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia #110 (1951)
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Adorno/Warhol
Andy Warhol, "Marilyn Diptych" (1962)
"The objective dissolution of society is subjectively manifested in the weakening of the erotic urge, unable to bind together self-preserving monads, as if mankind were imitating the physicists' theory of the exploding universe....When Casanova called a woman unprejudiced, he meant that no religious convention prevented her from giving herself; today the unprejudiced woman is the one who no longer believes in love, who will not be hoodwinked into investing more than she can expect in return. Sexuality, the supposed instigator of all the bustle, has become the delusion that self-denial comprised in the past. As the arrangements of life no longer allow time for pleasure conscious of itself [i.e., free and rational], replacing it by the performance of physiological functions, de-inhibited sex is itself de-sexualized."
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia #107 (1951)
Adorno/Nimmalaikaew
Uttaporn Nimmalaikaew, "Drifting" (2006) [inkjet on canvas followed by two layers of oil paint on mosquito netting]
"The exchange relationship that love partially withstood throughout the bourgeois age has completely absorbed it; the last immediacy falls victim to the distance of all the contracting parties from all the others. Love is chilled by the value that the ego places on itself. Loving at all seems to it like loving more, and he who loves more puts himself in the wrong."
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia #107 (1951)
Wednesday, August 29, 2007
Adorno/Aghdashlou
Aydin Aghdashlou, "The Triumph of Death" (1980)
"The fulfillment of persecution-fantasies springs from their affinity with bloody realities. Violence, on which civilization is based, means the persecution of all by all, and the persecution-maniac puts himself at a disadvantage only by blaming on his neighbor what is perpetrated by the whole, in a helpless attempt to make the incommensurable commensurable. He is burnt because he seeks to grasp directly, as with his bare hands, the objective delusion which he resembles, whereas the absurd order consists precisely in its perfected indirectness."
-Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia #103, (1951)
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